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Abstract 
 
Essays on the Economics of Education 
 
 
Joshua C. Hall 
 
The dissertation is a collection of essays examining three topics in the economics of 
education. The essays focus on the institutional structure of local and national education 
and the implications that demographics and institutional structure has on the productivity 
and financing of education. The first chapter introduces my essays by providing a brief 
overview of the economic study of education and highlights some of the major areas of 
research overlapping the topics covered in this dissertation. Chapter 2 looks at the impact 
of racial diversity on school performance. A measure of racial diversity is constructed for 
Ohio school districts to investigate the net effect of racial diversity on school district 
performance on statewide exams. The empirical results of this chapter suggest that racial 
diversity negatively affects school district performance. Chapter 3 considers the impact of 
interjurisdictional competition in the choice of a tax base. A spatial probit model is used 
on Ohio school district data to investigate two issues: 1) do school districts engage in 
‘yardstick competition’ in their choice of an income tax; and 2) does the negative impact 
of interjurisdictional competition disappear once yardstick competition is taken into 
account. The empirical evidence shows that districts do engage in yardstick competition 
but that controlling for yardstick competition does not affect the significance of 
interjurisdictional competition. Chapter 4 examines the role of institutions in the return to 
human and physical capital. A theoretical model is developed where the effect of the 
change in capital on the rate of growth depends on the level of institutional quality. The 
empirical model is estimated using cross-country data, where measures of a country’s 
institutions are interacted with their growth rates of physical and human capital. The 
empirical results suggest that the institutional environment is very important in 
translating human and physical capital accumulation into economic growth. Chapter 5 
summarizes the key findings of previous chapters and discusses areas of future research. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 The Economics of Education 
The emergence of the economics of education as an autonomous field in of inquiry within 
economics did not begin until the early 1960s (Texeira 2000) when Theodore Schultz 
(1961) made human capital the topic of his 1960 presidential address to the American 
Economic Association. Human capital is the idea that the schooling and skills that 
individuals acquire are not purely consumption goods but instead are assets that yield 
income and other outputs over time. While the concept of human capital had been around 
since the time of Adam Smith ([1776] 1998), the term and its study first came into 
popular use beginning with Schultz’s presidential address. Historian of economic thought 
Mark Blaug (1972) credits Schultz with initiating the ‘human investment revolution in 
economic thought’ with his presidential address, subsequent articles, and influence over 
graduate students at the University of Chicago. In terms of overall importance to study of 
what we know consider the field of the economics of education, however, no one 
individual has had more influence than Gary Becker.  
His first article (1962) and book (1964) on human capital formed the theoretical 
and empirical approach to human capital that we employ today. In his post-Nobel tribute 
to Becker, Sherwin Rosen (1993: 26) says that “no one other than Becker has developed 
these ideas into such a coherent and fruitful theory.” What separated Becker and others 
post-1960 economists working on human capital issues from the previous literature on 
the economics of education was a theoretical framework that allowed education to be 
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both an investment and consumption good. Prior to 1960, the conventional view in 
economics was that individuals attended school primarily because it was compulsory. 
Any additional education beyond the age of compulsion was generally treated as 
consumption (Blaug 1976). According to Rosen (1993), Becker’s theoretical and 
empirical contributions forced the discipline to take a closer look at education, which in 
turn led to tremendous improvements in our understanding of earnings in labor markets 
(Psacharapolous 1985), the organization of the firm (Williamson 1985) and economic 
growth (Romer 1986).  
The 1960s and 1970s saw tremendous gains being made in human capital theory. 
At the same time, began to focus on the institutional structure of education and its impact 
on school outcomes. Unlike human capital theory, which primarily focused on explaining 
wages or labor earnings, this new line of inquiry focused attention on how various inputs 
into the education process translated into student outcomes (Hanushek 1996). 
Researchers began to use so-called ‘education production functions’ to look at a variety 
of factors thought to influence school productivity, typically measured by standardized 
test scores or graduation rates. A prominent strain of this literature focuses on the role 
that school resources play in school performance (Hanushek 1997). Another line of 
inquiry focuses on the interaction between the structure of schooling in the United States 
and its effect on school financing and outcomes. It is in this general area that my 
dissertation focuses.  
In his seminal paper, Tiebout (1956) considered households working in a 
geographic area choosing among a market of local public good producers. In the extreme, 
households would sort themselves into homogenous communities based on their 
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preferences over the local public good being provided such as education. If every 
household had the same preference, there would only need to be one jurisdiction. As the 
number of different household preferences for education increase, the number of 
jurisdictions should increase proportionally to achieve perfect sorting by education 
preference. In the real world, however, economies of scale (Kenny and Schmidt 1994), 
geographic barriers (Hoxby 2000a), and legal barriers (Fischel 2007) limit the number of 
school districts to a level below what would allow perfect sorting. As a result, the 
educational preferences of many residents might vary considerably from that of the 
median voter. This preference fractionalization can lead to reduced political oversight and 
governance by voters (Romer, Rosenthal, and Munley 1992) or reduced spending on 
public schools (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999). Chapter 2 extends this literature by 
considering the possibility that preference fractionalization by race leads not only to 
lower spending but also to a decline in school quality. 
Competition among local school districts has been found to lead to higher test 
scores (Staley and Blair 1995; Hoxby 2000a). These general findings have recently been 
called into question on empirical grounds (Rothstein 2005; Brasington 2007). Brasington 
(2007) argues that failure to account for spatial dependence has led to an overstatement of 
the effectiveness of interjurisdictional competition. The interjurisdictional competition 
literature has been extended to the research on local government choice of tax 
instruments. School districts might prefer to diversify their tax base by adopting an 
income tax but choose not to do so, given that high-income residents might flee to nearby 
school districts. This issue is addressed further in Chapter 3 using spatial econometrics to 
address spatial dependence among school districts.  
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Institutions – the humanly devised constraints that structure political and 
economic interaction (North 1991) – have long been understood to be important to 
economic development. Development economists have only recently begun to understand 
the primacy of institutions for development policy (Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 
2004). Despite the recent recognition of the importance of institutions, traditional growth 
theory and the development policy it engenders still tends to focus on physical and 
human capital accumulation. In bad institutional environments, however, investment in 
physical and human capital often has a lower social return because the increase in capital 
is often directed towards zero or negative-sum activities. Actions that are privately 
optimal in bad institutional environments (such as rent-seeking), reduce or eliminate the 
benefits accruing to society at large from additions to the human and physical capital 
stocks. Instead of increasing economic growth, spending scarce resources on physical and 
human capital in countries with poor institutional environments can actually lower output 
per worker instead of increasing it. The role that institutional quality plays in the return 
on physical and human capital accumulation is investigated in Chapter 4.  
 
1.2 Dissertation Research Agenda 
There are three research essays in this dissertation that examine the effect of institutions 
on educational outcomes and financing. The first essay, Chapter 2, looks at the impact of 
racial diversity on school district performance. Chapter 3 addresses the issue of fiscal 
competition in the choice among of an income tax and Chapter 4 examines the 
effectiveness of investment in human and physical capital in different institutional 
environments. Chapter 5 concludes with an overview of my findings. 
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In Chapter 2, I examine the empirical issue of whether or not racial diversity is 
good for school district performance. The impact of racial diversity on school 
performance has been an important policy issue for a long time, with social scientists 
attempting to measure the influence of racial diversity on the academic achievement of 
African-Americans since at least the 1954 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education. In recent years, the economics literature has turned its attention back 
to the issue of race as many popular school reforms such as ability tracking and charter 
schools have led the racial composition of schools to become more homogeneous. As a 
result of this change, a body of research has developed that looks at the effect of race on 
school performance.  
In the literature there are two possible channels through which racial diversity 
could influence school district performance. The first perspective – the racial peer effect 
channel – views integration as having positive benefits flowing from children of different 
racial backgrounds being exposed to one another. Following Brown v. Board of 
Education, this literature primarily focused on the impact of increased racial diversity on 
African-American students. A second channel through which racial diversity could affect 
school performance is through voting. Different racial groups could have systematically 
different preferences over how schools should be operated and these different preferences 
could manifest themselves in policies that are not conducive to the efficient operation of 
schools. The basic intuition behind the models in this area is that in diverse communities 
disagreement over the ‘right’ education policy will lead individuals with preferences 
drastically different from the median voter to undertake actions that reduce school 
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quality. For example, disgruntled voters could vote against new spending on schools in 
order to finance private consumption.  
These channels are both theoretically important reasons why racial diversity 
might affect academic performance; however, these channels suggest different directional 
effects of increasing racial diversity. The voting channel suggests that increasing racial 
diversity would lead to a decline in school quality holding other factors constant while 
the peer effect channel suggests that increasing diversity raises school quality. 
Furthermore, the racial peer effect literature focuses almost exclusively on the benefits to 
African-American children. If non-African-American students do worse as diversity 
increases, the overall effect of increased diversity could be negative. In this chapter I 
focus on the net effect of racial diversity on school performance.  Using data on Ohio 
school districts I find a consistently negative relationship between racial diversity and 
school quality as measured by district-level test scores using a variety of different 
specifications and robustness checks. 
 Chapter 3 considers the effect of interjurisdictional competition on the use of an 
income tax to finance schools. Economic theory would predict that when given the 
opportunity to do so, local governments would diversify across as many revenue sources 
as possible. Ohio is one of two states that allow school districts to choose among tax 
instruments. Public choice theory would suggest that local policymakers have an 
incentive to diversify their tax base in order to minimize the risk associated with over-
reliance on any one particular tax base. Even if politicians did not value diversification 
for political reasons, standard public finance principles (the ‘three-legged stool’ of 
income, property, and sales taxes) argue in favor of diversification across all available 
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bases. However when given the chance, many local governments do not diversify their 
tax base. Why?  
One argument put forth in the literature is that is that tax bases differ in their 
mobility characteristics. The property tax base is primarily fixed in the short run while 
the income tax base is fairly mobile. Local governments are unwilling to adopt an income 
tax only to see mobile high-income households move to a nearby district. This theory 
predicts that as the cost of mobility increases (fewer school districts in a given geographic 
area) more school districts will use the income tax. Spry (2005) tested this theory using 
data on Ohio school districts and found that the number of districts within 10 miles 
depresses income tax adoption.  
In my paper, I challenge this finding on theoretical and empirical grounds. Caplan 
(2001) argues you cannot escape taxation by moving because of capitalization. Since the 
costs and benefits of higher taxes are reflected in home prices, high-income taxpayers 
cannot escape school district income taxes. When they go to sell their home they will get 
less for the home because of the higher tax-to-benefit ratio. Thus ‘voting with your feet’ 
is unlikely to limit the use of income taxes. In addition, the spatial pattern of income tax 
adoption identified by Spry (2005) as being consistent with interjurisdictional 
competition depressing income tax usage is also consistent with other spatial theories, 
such as yardstick competition, or non-spatial reasons such as tax exportation.  
In addition, Spry (2005) employs traditional probit when estimating the 
probability of a school district adopting an income tax. This approach does not take into 
account spatial spillovers and thus estimated parameters are likely to be biased, 
inconsistent, and inefficient (Anselin 1988). Previous empirical work has found that the 
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effects of interjurisdictional competition often disappear once spatial effects are taken 
into account (Brasington 2007), suggesting that the previous literature might be 
contaminated by spatially omitted variable bias. This chapter addresses spatially omitted 
variable bias and tests for yardstick competition using spatial econometric techniques. 
The results show that interjurisdictional competition does not depress the use of an 
income tax once spatial dependence is taken into account. In addition, there is evidence 
of positive yardstick competition between neighboring districts. The primary factor found 
to depress income tax usage is the amount of business property within the school district, 
suggesting that school district residents would rather attempt to export a portion of their 
tax burden onto non-resident property owners rather than levy an income tax for which 
they would bear the entire burden. 
Chapter 4 examines the return to increases in human and physical capital across 
nations. Early research showing a relationship between education and economic growth 
led development economists to focus on human capital in addition to physical capital as 
primary inputs into stimulating growth in developing countries (Coyne and Boettke 
2006). The World Bank, for example, encouraged high levels of government investment 
in primary schooling in an attempt to increase human capital levels, leading to a 
tremendous expansion of schooling in nearly all developing countries (Easterly 2001). 
Unfortunately, this increase in education has not uniformly led to increased economic 
growth. Some countries, like Taiwan, greatly increased education levels and did well 
economically while other countries such as Zambia stagnated. What makes investment in 
human (and physical) capital effective in some countries and not in others?  
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In this essay I address this question by considering the institutional context of 
investment in human and physical capital. Societal payoffs to investment in human 
capital are largely dependent on the institutional context in which those investments 
occur. Consider two countries with equal levels and productivity of human capital 
investment but vastly different institutional quality. In the country with good institutions 
such as the rule of law and minimal government intervention into the economy, 
additional human capital will generally be employed towards positive-sum activities. It is 
the generation and exploitation of these positive-sum entrepreneurial opportunities that 
results in economic progress. Conversely, in the country with poor economic institutions, 
human capital is more likely to be employed towards zero-sum or negative-sum 
economic activities. While the educated might benefit personally from their additional 
education, the exploitation of the mostly negative-sum opportunities available to them in 
a bad institutional environment will result in economic regress.  
A theoretical model is developed that allows the effect of changes in output per 
worker to vary along with institutional quality. I then test this model empirically using 
data on 96 countries from 1980-2000 and find that the effect of changes in human and 
physical capital varies considerably with the level of institutional quality. The results 
indicate that for countries with the lowest quality institutions the return to investments in 
human and physical capital per worker are negative and that there exists some ‘break-
even’ point of institutional quality where returns become positive. The break-even point 
for physical capital is lower than for human capital, suggesting that countries with 
institutional quality between the two break-even points focus on physical capital instead 
of human capital. More importantly, however, these results focus attention towards 
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institutional reform as the key to economic progress so that all countries move above the 
break-even point for both forms of capital.  
 11
 
Chapter 2 
Racial Diversity and School Performance 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The impact of racial diversity on school performance has long been a concern of parents 
and policymakers. The influence of racial diversity on the academic achievement of 
African-American students was at the heart of the 1954 U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education (Armor 1995). ‘White flight’, where white families move to 
segregated communities or enroll their children in private schools, is another historical 
manifestation of this concern (Fairlie and Resch 2002). More recently, the public policy 
debate surrounding ability tracking, charter schooling, open enrollment, and school 
vouchers has been rife with concern over how these policies will impact school racial 
composition and resulting academic outcomes (Greene 1999; Renzulli and Evans 2004). 
As a result of this concern, a body of research has developed that looks at the effect of 
racial ‘peer effects’ on school performance.  
 Following the Brown v. Board of Education decision, early social science 
research focused primarily on the harmful effects of racial isolation on the academic 
performance of African-Americans. Two influential reports were Coleman et al. (1966) 
and the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1967), which found that the racial isolation 
experienced by African-American students in segregated schools lowered their academic 
achievement. Jenks et al. (1972) finds that desegregation improves black children’s 
school performance by two to three percent. Guryan (2004) estimates that half of the 
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decline in black dropout rates during the 1970s occurred because of desegregation. 
Hoxby (2000b) finds that black third graders perform substantially worse when 
surrounded by other black students than in classes that are primarily white. Hanushek, 
Kain, and Rivkin (2004) isolate the peer composition of racial diversity and find similar 
results, namely that having a higher percentage of black classmates lowers black 
academic achievement. Thus positive racial peer effects are the conventional channel 
through which racial diversity is thought to affect school performance. 
 Another channel through which racial diversity could affect school performance is 
through the ballot box. There is a growing body of research in international development 
demonstrating that racial, ethnic, and linguistic diversity has a negative effect on the 
individuals’ willingness to spend on publicly-provided goods like roads and schools.1 
Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) develop a simple theoretical model showing how 
diverse preferences over a publicly-provided good can lead to reduced spending. The 
basic intuition behind their model is that diverse communities will have lower public 
spending because individuals with preferences vastly different from the median voter will 
prefer to keep taxes low and spend their money on private consumption.  
Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) argue that racial groups often have very 
different views on public policies such as bilingual education (see, for example, Leal and 
Hess (2000)).  In their model, the groups whose preferences are not reflected in school 
policy vote for lower spending rather than financially support policies with which they 
disagree. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) provide some empirical confirmation of 
                                                 
1 The economic literature primarily uses the term ‘fractionalization’ when discussing diversity. In 
the interest of clarity, here I will exclusively use the phrase diversity, even when discussing 
papers on racial and ethno-linguistic fractionalization. In most studies, ethno-linguistic diversity 
is defined as the probability that two individuals randomly drawn from a jurisdiction are from 
different ethno-linguistic groups. See Alesina et al. (2003) for an overview of this research. 
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their theoretical model by showing empirically that cities and counties with high levels of 
racial diversity have lower spending on schools, roads, and other publicly-provided 
goods. If spending less on schools leads to lower output, their work suggests a different 
channel through which racial diversity could lead to lower school performance. 2 
Both the peer effect channel and the voting channel are important reasons why 
racial diversity might affect school performance. However, these channels are in conflict 
since the peer effect channel generally supports the view that integration improves school 
performance, while the voting channel proposes that racial diversity lowers it. 
Furthermore, the literature on racial ‘peer effects’ is almost exclusively focused on the 
effect of racial concentration on the academic success of black students, not on the net 
effect of diversity.3 If other students do worse in integrated classrooms, the overall effect 
of racial diversity on education outcomes could be negative. Thus when the racial peer 
effect literature shows that integration increases test scores for black students, this tells us 
little about how racial diversity impacts overall school performance.4  
In this paper, I fill that gap by focusing on the net effect of racial diversity on 
school performance. Using data on Ohio school districts, I find a consistently negative 
relationship between racial diversity and student performance at the district level. I begin 
first by describing my data: how the index of racial diversity is constructed, the measure 
                                                 
2 In the international context, the link between spending and school performance is extremely 
difficult to test given the lack of consistent test score data. Easterly and Levine (1999) find, 
however, that ethno-linguistic diversity is negatively correlated with the years of schooling 
people obtain.  
3 For example, both Hoxby (2000b) and Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004) find that blacks, 
Hispanics, and whites all do worse as the percentage of their classmates that are black increases.  
This clearly suggests that there might be a trade-off between improved black achievement and 
reduced white or Hispanic achievement, although they do not address the net effect.  
4 One exception is Angrist and Lang (2004) who find modest positive peer effects for minority 
third graders from integration with no negative effects for white students. 
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of school district performance, and the independent variables used in the analysis. Then I 
present the empirical results using both OLS and IV estimation, demonstrating that the 
negative relationship between racial diversity and school performance is healthy to a 
variety of different specifications and robustness checks. Finally, I conclude with a 
discussion of the policy and research implications of my results. 
 
2.2 Data 
I construct my data set from two sources. The first source is the Ohio Department of 
Education’s ‘Cupp Report.’5 The Cupp Report summarizes all of the data collected by the 
Ohio Department of Education on individual local school districts. The report contains 
data on student outcomes, student demographics, teacher demographics, district 
spending, revenue, property valuation, and tax information. The second data source is the 
U.S. Census Bureau’s special ‘Census 2000 School District Tabulation.’ From the 2000 
Census report I obtained racial data on school district residents, the mean household 
income within each school district, linguistic diversity, adult education levels, and private 
school enrollment by school district. All variables from the ‘Census 2000 School District 
Tabulation’ and the ‘Cupp Report’ are for the 1999-2000 school term.6  
                                                 
5 The Cupp Report was renamed in 2006 to ‘Finance and Other Data.’ The most recent version of 
the publication formerly known as the Cupp Report can be found online at 
<http://www.ode.state.oh.us>. 
6 The Cupp Report is not kept historically and is generally published with a two-year lag. Thus 
the Cupp Report data for the 1999-2000 school year was collected from the Ohio Department of 
Education’s website in early 2002. 
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 Focusing within one state can be problematic if there is insufficient variation 
among school districts within the state.7 Lack of diversity or a few significant outliers can 
lead to imprecise or statistically biased results. This is not a problem with Ohio, which is 
a large and geographically diverse state containing 612 local school districts. Ohio has 
several large metropolitan school districts with over thirty thousand students and 
numerous small rural districts with fewer than one thousand students. While over a 
quarter of a million students are enrolled in Ohio’s five largest city school districts, over 
eighty-five percent of students are enrolled in the remaining suburban, exurban, small 
city, and rural school districts. After removing five small rural school districts due to 
incomplete data, the final sample contains 607 school districts.8  
 My variable of primary interest is the degree of racial diversity within a school 
district. Intuitively, the racial diversity index measures the probability that two school 
district residents drawn randomly will be of different races. The degree of racial diversity 
within a school district is calculated using the following formula:  
                   Racial Diversity = ( )21 ∑−
i
iRace            (1) 
where Racei is the percentage of a school district’s population that identifies itself as 
being of that particular race. The racial classifications I use are those presented by the 
                                                 
7 Many states, for example, have only county-level school districts. The observed level of racial 
integration across school districts in these states may have less to do with preferences for 
integration and more to do with the lack of interjurisdictional competition. Clotfelter (1999), for 
example, finds less across district segregation but more within district segregation in the South, 
where county-level school districts are the norm. 
8 Ohio has four ‘island districts’ that serve children living year-round on resort islands in Lake 
Erie. The small size of these districts means that often times an entire grade level is comprised of 
only one student. For this reason, the Ohio Department of Education censors data on these school 
districts due to privacy concerns. College Corner Local School District was removed because it is 
a combined Ohio/Indiana school district and thus represents a blending of both states financial 
and property tax systems. 
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U.S. Census Bureau to individuals on the census form. There are seven racial 
classifications in the 2000 Census School District Tabulation: White, Black, Asian and 
Pacific Islander, American Indian, Native Hawaiian, Some Other Race Alone, and Two 
or More Races. A completely racially-homogenous school district would have an ethnic 
diversity score of zero. A school district whose population was equally split between two 
races would have a racial diversity score of 0.5.9 A district where each racial 
classification was one-seventh of the population would have a score of 0.857.  
Admittedly, these racial classifications do not directly correspond to individuals 
notions of race. There is, for example, no category for ‘Hispanic.’ The Census Bureau 
does not ask individuals if they are ‘Hispanic’ in the context of asking about an 
individual’s race. That information is obtained from questions on place of origin. Alesina, 
Baqir and Easterly (1999) provide some evidence that the category ‘Some Other Race 
Alone’ is, for all intents and purposes, equivalent to Hispanic.10 In addition, the treatment 
of multiracial individuals as having a separate racial identity is problematic. Individuals 
identifying themselves as multiracial for the purposes of the Census probably do not 
consider ‘multiracial’ interests or have a ‘multiracial’ perspective when at the ballot box. 
Multiracial individuals are likely to have preferences that are closely aligned to another 
racial classification because of cultural or identity reasons. Given the impossibility of 
                                                 
9 (0.5^2) + (0.5^2) = 0.5. 
10 Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) argue that their racial classification of ‘Other’ is essentially 
Hispanic, given that the correlation between the two Census Variables is 90 percent. They do not 
include a separate category for multiracial individuals, however, so it is not clear if their ‘Other’ 
classification is identical to the classification ‘Some Other Race Alone’ or if it also includes 
multiracial individuals. The high correlation between Hispanic and ‘Other’ suggests that they did 
not include multiracial individuals with ‘Other.’  
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knowing the proper allocation of multiracial individuals among the basic racial 
classifications, I keep the category Two or More Races separate.11   
  District-level racial diversity has considerable variability in Ohio. The most 
racially-homogenous district in the state is Jennings Local School District in Putnam 
County, a primarily rural area located in Northwest Ohio. During the 2000 Census, 1905 
of the district’s residents where white and four of the districts residents were Asian, 
which gave the district a racial diversity score of 0.005. The most racially-fractionalized 
school district in the state is its largest, the Cleveland Municipal School District, with a 
score of 0.567. The average school district in the state has a racial diversity score of 
0.102 and the standard deviation of this variable is 0.109.  
The presence of a large urban school district, such as Cleveland, as the most 
racially-diverse school district in the state could lead to the conclusion that racial 
diversity is a proxy for large, predominantly poor, urban school districts. A look at 
racially-diverse school districts reveals that this might not be the case. While large urban 
school districts such as Akron, Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Columbus, Toledo, and 
Youngstown are among the most racially-diverse school districts in the state, they are 
sprinkled around middle-to high-income suburban districts such as Shaker Heights 
School District in Cleveland. Shaker Heights High School was recently cited by the Wall 
Street Journal as being one of the top feeder schools to elite colleges (Bernstein 2004) 
and its racial diversity attracts families to the area with a preference for integration 
(Brand-Williams 2002). The simple correlation between racial diversity and median 
                                                 
11 Exclusion of the category Two or More Races from the calculation of the racial diversity 
variable does not change the results presented in the paper.  
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income per taxpayer in a school district is a negative 0.014 and is not statistically 
significant.12  
My primary dependent variable is the percentage of school district students 
passing the ninth grade math proficiency test during 1999-2000 school year. In Ohio, all 
students are required to take and pass five subject areas tests beginning in ninth grade in 
order to matriculate with a regular diploma.13 During the 1999-2000 school year, tests 
were administered in math, reading, writing, citizenship, and science. In the interests of 
parsimony, I focus only on one test – the ninth grade math exam.14 The proficiency test 
scores from other ninth grade tests were used, however, to check the math test results 
against alternative definitions of school performance. The outcomes of a baseline 
regression employing the four other tests as a dependent variable are presented in 
Appendix Table 1.15  
In addition to using racial diversity by school district to explain passage rates on 
statewide math exams, I include control variables representing family, community, and 
school influences that are conventional in the literature (Hanushek 2002). A full list of all 
of the variables is included in Table 2.1 along with descriptive statistics. Median income 
per tax return in the school district is included in the basic specification to account for 
                                                 
12 The null hypothesis of zero relationship cannot be rejected at the ten percent level of 
significance (z critical value of 0.334). 
13 Ohio’s testing system has subsequently been revamped and the test required for graduation is a 
new tenth grade proficiency exam. 
14 The math test was chosen for two reasons. First, it is the most objective of the five exams. 
Second, historically it is the most difficult of the tests. Fisher (2001) notes that of the 2,678 
students unable to graduate with their class because they failed one or more portions of the test, 
1,888 failed the math portion.  
15 All of the measures of school performance are level scores instead of value-added scores. This 
could be problematic if value-added scores are a more appropriate measure of school 
performance. Brasington (1999) tests 37 different measures of school performance and finds that 
the measures of school performance that are capitalized into home prices are level scores not 
value-added scores, suggesting that use of level-scores is appropriate.  
 19
family and background effects (Goldhaber and Brewer 1997). School-related inputs are 
district spending per pupil (Hedges and Greenwald 1996; Hanushek 1997), the student-
to-teacher ratio (Krueger 2003), the average salary of classroom teachers, and the 
percentage of classroom teachers with up to four years of experience (Rivkin, Hanushek, 
and Kain 2005).  
Variable   Definitions Mean (S.D.)
Racial Diversity 2000 See text for definition 0.101 (0.109)
Racial Diversity 1990 See text for definition 0.077 (0.096)
Linguistic Diversity See text for definition 0.128 (0.064)
Income Diversity Mean household income / median household income 1.214 (0.104)
Black % of Black district residents 0.037 (0.091)
Math % of district students passing 9th grade math test 0.769 (0.117)
Science % of district students passing 9th grade science test 0.827 (0.096)
Reading % of district students passing 9th grade reading test 0.928 (0.054)
Citizenship % of district students passing 9th grade citizenship test 0.857 (0.081)
Writing % of district students passing 9th grade writing test 0.936 (0.050)
Graduation Rate % of Fall 1996 9th grade class graduating in 2000 0.863 (0.090)
Spending Per Pupil School district spending per pupil $6,662 (1,142)
Attendance % of district students in attendance on an average day 0.948 (0.013)
Teacher Inexperience % of teachers with 4 or fewer years of experience 0.227 (0.080)
Pupil/Teacher Ratio Enrollment / classroom teachers 18.28 (2.045)
Average Teacher Salary Average salary of classroom teachers in the district $39,320 (4,908)
Income Median income per tax return filed within district $30,571 (6,411)
College % of district residents 25 & older with at least a BA 0.172 (0.122)
Free or Reduced Lunch % of students eligible for free or reduced price lunch 0.212 (0.143)
District Size Number of students enrolled in the district 3,008 (5,274)
Density District population / district square mileage 778 (2,405)
Private School % of 5-17 year-olds attending private schools 0.102 (0.075)
Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics
Table 2.1
Note: All observations are for the 1999-2000 school year unless otherwise noted.  
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Population density has been found to influence student outcomes although the 
exact reason is unclear (Driscoll, Halcoussis, and Svorny 2003). Driscoll, Halcoussis, and 
Svorny (2003) hypothesize that there is a negative relationship between population 
density and school performance because it is more difficult to educate in urban schools. 
District size is included to account for possible diseconomies of scale with respect to 
school district size. A large number of studies find a negative relationship between school 
district size and student performance (Fox 1981; Niskanen 1998; Driscoll, Halcoussis, 
and Svorny 2003).16 Finally, attendance is included to account for the fact that school 
districts with higher attendance rates have higher test scores (Lamdin 1996).  
 
2.3  OLS Results 
Figure 2.1 depicts a simple negatively-sloped regression line fitted between district 
passage rates on the ninth grade math test and racial diversity. In order to test this 
observed relationship econometrically, I estimate the following model using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS):  
εββ +++= ∑
=
ix
X
x
xii ZBRSITYRACIALDIVEORMANCESCHOOLPERF ,
1
10      (2) 
where SCHOOLPERFORMANCEi is the passage rate on the ninth grade math 
proficiency test in district i for the 1999-2000 school year; RACIALDIVERSITYi is the 
degree to which the residents of school district i are divided among different racial 
categories; and Zi is a vector of control variables representing school, community, and 
                                                 
16 For a recent contrary view, see Heinesen (2005). 
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family influences for each district. 1β  is the coefficient of primary interest as it measures 
the impact of racial diversity on the measure of school performance. 
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The OLS regression results are presented in Table 2.2, which provide preliminary 
evidence that racial diversity is negatively related to school performance. A baseline 
regression is presented in Column 1 of Table 2.2. This basic model does a good job, 
explaining nearly 60 percent of the variation in passage rates on the ninth grade math 
proficiency test across school districts. The key variable of interest, racial diversity, is 
negative and statistically significant at the one percent level. The racial diversity variable 
theoretically varies from complete homogeneity at zero to perfect heterogeneity at one, 
making interpretation of the coefficient on racial diversity fairly simple.  
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-2.65 *** -1.76 *** -1.75 ***
(6.13) (3.96) (3.89)
-0.2805 *** -0.2431 *** -0.2423 ***
(5.85) (5.12) (5.12)
-0.0085 ** -0.0052 -0.0049
(2.07) (1.24) (1.13)
0.0062 *** 0.0005 0.0004
(8.11) (0.49) (0.40)
3.5363 *** 2.7932 *** 2.8042 ***
(7.82) (6.21) (6.21)
-0.0054 *** -0.0038 * -0.0038 *
(2.60) (1.93) (1.91)
0.0023 ** 0.0007 0.0007
(2.15) (0.64) (0.66)
-0.1178 ** -0.1099 ** -0.1095 **
(2.49) (2.39) (2.37)
Density -0.0032 -0.0035 -0.0036
(1.27) (1.45) (1.45)
District Size -0.00002 -0.00009 -0.0001
(0.02) (0.12) (0.13)
0.2094 *** 0.2202 ***
(4.51) (3.70)
-0.2141 *** -0.2102 ***
(4.16) (3.98)
-0.0130
(0.26)
-0.0134
(0.21)
Number of Observations 607 607 607
R-squared 0.59 0.62 0.62
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
Linguistic Diversity
Racial Diversity and District Math Scores: OLS Estimates
College
Lunch
Average Teacher Salary 
Teacher Inexperience
1 2 3
Table 2.2
Absolute value of heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics in parentheses.
Attendance
Pupil/Teacher Ratio
Constant
Racial Diversity 2000
Income Diversity
Expenditure Per Pupil   
Income
Note : Expenditure Per Pupil, Income, Average Teacher Salary, Density, and District 
Size in thousands.
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The coefficient on racial diversity from specification 1 (-0.2805) suggests that a 
move from complete racial homogeneity to the racial diversity of the Mount Healthy 
School District (0.498) would lower a district’s passage rates on the ninth grade math 
proficiency test by nearly 14 percentage points. Calculated at the mean, that represents a 
decline in the average district’s passage rates on the ninth grade math proficiency exam 
by over one standard deviation. Note, however, that a movement in a district’s racial 
diversity score by 0.5 would represent a five standard deviation change. So while the 
effect of racial diversity on school performance is negative and significant, short-run 
changes in the racial composition of school districts are unlikely to have a significant 
effect on test scores. A school district moving one standard deviation away from 
complete homogeneity is expected to observe a decline in the passage rate on the ninth 
grade math test by 2.8 percentage points. To put this in context compared to another 
explanatory variable, a one standard deviation decline in a school district’s attendance 
rate is associated with a 4.6 percentage point fall in math test scores. 
Notably, racial diversity is negatively associated with district passage rates 
holding school spending constant. This provides some indirect evidence that the effect of 
racial diversity on school performance occurs directly rather than flowing through its 
negative effect on school spending. Whether this is because of negative peer effects or 
some other channel is difficult to discern given the methodological approach.  
 In column 2 of Table 2.2, I control for additional socioeconomic variables that 
might influence school performance to see if this observed relationship between racial 
diversity and school performance is robust to alternative specifications. The new controls 
added to specification 2 are the percentage of district residents with at least a bachelor’s 
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degree and the percentage of district students eligible for free or reduced price lunch. The 
percentage of school district residents over 25 with at least a bachelor’s degree is 
obtained from the 2000 Census School District Tabulation and the percentage of district 
students eligible for free or reduced price lunch is obtained from the Cupp Report.  
 Both additional variables are statistically significant at the one percent level. As 
expected, the greater the percentage of school district residents with at least a bachelor’s 
degree, the higher the district’s passage rate on the ninth grade math exam. Conversely, 
the higher the percentage of students eligible for free or reduced price lunch the lower a 
school district’s passage rate on the exam. The impact of racial diversity is reduced 
slightly by the introduction of these additional variables but remains statistically 
significant at the one percent level. Here, a district moving from complete racial 
homogeneity to the middle of the racial diversity spectrum (0.5) is associated with a 12 
percentage point decline in district passage rates.   
 The third column of Table 2.2 provides a final check on the robustness of the OLS 
results by adding two more explanatory variables to the model. It is possible that in 
addition to being fractionalized by race, individuals might be fractionalized by class or 
income. To account for possible stratification of individuals by income, the ratio between 
the mean and median income in a school district is used as a measure of income 
diversity.17 The second explanatory variable is the degree of linguistic diversity across 
school district households. Calculated in a manner identical to the racial diversity 
                                                 
17 The ratio of mean to median income is used here instead of a measure similar to the racial 
diversity variable due to the limited nature of income data for school districts. Here mean income 
per school district comes from the 2000 Census and median income by school district comes from 
the Cupp Report. 
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variable, this variable measures the degree to which individuals in a school district are 
separated by language barriers.18  
 The inclusion of these additional variables does not change the finding of a strong 
negative relationship between racial diversity and school performance. The coefficient on 
racial diversity is nearly identical to the coefficient from the second specification and 
remains significant at the one percent level. Moving from racial homogeneity to racial 
diversity of 0.5 is associated with a 12 percentage point decline in math test passage 
rates. Both the income diversity and linguistic diversity variable are not statistically 
significant at conventional levels.  
 
2.4  IV Results 
It is possible that the direction of causation does not run just from racial diversity to 
school performance but also from school performance to racial diversity. School districts 
could become racially fractionalized if household migration in response to school 
performance is not uniform by race. While it is clear that public school performance is 
important in intraurban migration (Jud and Bennett 1986), there is little evidence that 
racial groups systematically differ in their response to school performance.19  
However, differences across racial groups in response to school performance are 
not necessary to generate changes in diversity. Even if blacks and whites have similar 
                                                 
18 This variable is calculated from the 2000 Census School District Tabulation (Table P2). Only 
households that are ‘linguistically isolated’ are calculated as separate groups.  
19 There is some evidence that Blacks and Whites do systematically differ in residential location 
patterns. South and Crowder (1997), using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 
provide some evidence of these differences. They find that even after standardizing for racial 
differences in income blacks are far less likely to move from central cities to the suburbs than are 
Whites. This could be the result of residential housing discrimination or because of different 
tastes for urban and suburban living. 
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residential mobility responses to school district performance, school district racial 
diversity can change solely because the racial composition of new district residents 
differs from the current composition. Consider the case of a racially diverse suburban 
school district surrounding a racially homogenous city school district. Since a large 
portion of intrametropolitan moves are ‘up and out’ (Bier 2001), the suburban district 
could become even more fractionalized over time even if blacks and whites move out of 
the district at the same rate. This is because the composition of new residents differs from 
the composition of exiting residents. 
 Even if changes in school district performance do lead to changes in racial 
diversity, the direction of this change is not clear in advance. Household mobility in 
response to school district performance could either increase or decrease diversity 
depending upon the current racial composition of the school district. A situation where a 
large number of white residents moved and were replaced by black residents could result 
in a school district become less fractionalized, if black households already comprised a 
majority share of households within the school district.  
Looking at the change in racial diversity over time, Ohio school districts were 
more racially fractionalized in 2000 than in 1990 as the racial composition of the state 
changed. The average school district in 1990 had a racial diversity score of 0.077. By 
2000, that number had changed to 0.101. The correlation between a school district’s 1990 
graduation rate and the change in racial diversity among district residents from 1990 to 
2000 is a positive 0.0515.20 It appears that better school districts in 1990, as measured by 
graduation rates, actually became more fractionalized, although the correlation between 
                                                 
20 Graduation rates were used instead of math test scores because Ohio had no standardized 
statewide testing system in place during the 1989-1990 school year. 
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these two variables in not statistically significant.21 This provides some evidence that 
endogeneity is not a problem.  
As an additional check against the possibility that endogeneity is biasing the OLS 
results, I follow Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) and instrument for racial diversity 
using lagged values of school district racial diversity.22 Each of the three specifications in 
Table 2.2 was re-estimated, with the 1990 racial diversity variable taking the place of the 
year 2000 measure. Table 2.3 contains the IV results, which seem to indicate that 
endogeneity was biasing the OLS estimates presented in Table 2.2 downward. That is, 
rather than overstating the effect of racial diversity on school performance, the OLS 
estimates understate the effect of racial diversity on school performance. This is 
consistent with the fact that better performing school districts in 1990 saw increases in 
racial diversity over the subsequent decade.  
Instrumenting for racial diversity also increases the economic significance of 
racial diversity. The coefficients on racial diversity for all three specifications increase 
substantially after instrumentation. Using the coefficient estimate on racial diversity from 
specification 1, a move from racial homogeneity to a racial diversity score of 0.5 is 
associated with a 16.5 percentage point decline in district passage rates on the math 
proficiency exam. This represents a 2.5 percentage point increase over the corresponding 
estimate from the OLS results.  
    
                                                 
21 The null hypothesis of zero relationship cannot be rejected at the ten percent level of 
significance (z critical value of 1.27). 
22 The Census Bureau prepared the special school district tabulation for the first time for the 1990 
Census thus school district data such used to calculate the racial diversity variable is not available 
for years prior to 1989-1990 school year. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) were able to employ 
data from the 1970 Census because their paper only looked at education spending at the city and 
county level.  
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-2.68 *** -1.81 *** -1.8036 ***
(6.15) (4.05) (3.94)
-0.3298 *** -0.2786 *** -0.2779 ***
(5.65) (4.72) (4.75)
-0.0069 * -0.0039 -0.0036
(1.66) (0.93) (0.84)
0.0059 *** 0.0006 0.0006
(7.88) (0.59) (0.50)
3.5818 *** 2.8567 *** 2.8653 ***
(7.88) (6.32) (6.27)
-0.0054 *** -0.0040 ** -0.0039 **
(2.62) (1.98) (1.97)
0.0019 * 0.0004 0.0004
(1.74) (0.35) (0.37)
-0.1490 *** -0.1376 *** -0.1371 ***
(3.21) (3.03) (3.00)
Density -0.0030 -0.0033 -0.0033
(1.07) (1.24) (1.24)
District Size 0.00008 -0.00002 -0.00003
(0.09) (0.02) (0.03)
0.1914 0.2016 ***
(4.05) (3.33)
-0.2109 *** -0.2072 ***
(4.06) (3.92)
-0.0123
(0.25)
-0.0112
(0.17)
Number of Observations 607 607 607
R-squared 0.59 0.62 0.62
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
Income Diversity
Linguistic Diversity
Note : Expenditure Per Pupil, Income, Average Teacher Salary, Density, and District 
Size in thousands.
Absolute value of heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics in parentheses.
Average Teacher Salary 
Teacher Inexperience
College
Lunch
Expenditure Per Pupil   
Income
Attendance
Pupil/Teacher Ratio
Table 2.3
Racial Diversity and District Math Scores: IV Estimates
Constant
Racial Diversity 1990
1 2 3
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2.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
The fact that the relationship between racial diversity and school performance is 
consistent across all specifications in the OLS regressions provides some assurance that 
the association between the two variables is not spurious. The IV results provide some 
additional confidence that the relationship between racial diversity and test scores are not 
contaminated by endogeneity. Two possible concerns remain, however, and here I 
attempt to address them.  
The first potential problem is one raised by Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999), 
namely that ethnic diversity might be a proxy for the percentage of the population that is 
black. Given that the share of black residents is correlated with racial diversity this is 
certainly plausible. At the same time, the implications of the racial diversity variable and 
the percentage of residents that are black are much different. Racial diversity treats a 
school district with racial shares of 60 percent white, 30 percent black and 10 percent 
‘some other race only’ as being equivalent to a school district that is 60 percent black, 30 
percent ‘some other race only’ and 10 percent white. Conversely, the percentage black 
variable treats the two situations as being quite dissimilar.  
As Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) suggest, if percentage black is the ‘true’ 
variable reducing school performance, the inclusion of it in the regressions in Table 2.3 
should cause the coefficient on racial diversity to go to zero. The first column of Table 
2.4 shows the results of controlling for the percentage of district residents that are black. 
Inclusion of percentage black in the empirical model does lower the coefficient on the 
racial diversity variable in all three specifications compared to the results in Table 2.3, 
but the variable remains statistically significant at conventional levels across the board.  
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-1.82 *** -1.82 ***
(3.89) (3.89)
-0.1170 * -0.1188 *
(1.89) (1.92)
-0.0013 -0.0013
(0.30) (0.29)
0.0005 0.0005
(0.46) (0.47)
2.8352 *** 2.8358 ***
(6.03) (6.03)
-0.0036 * -0.0036 *
(1.79) (1.79)
0.0008 0.0008
(0.77) (0.78)
-0.1026 ** -0.1016 **
(2.32) (2.29)
-0.0025 -0.0025
(1.35) (1.31)
0.0003 0.0003
(0.32) (0.33)
0.1952 *** 0.1962 ***
(3.34) (3.37)
-0.1877 *** -0.1877 ***
(3.68) (3.68)
-0.0140 -0.0136
(0.29) (0.28)
-0.0541 -0.0453
(0.86) (0.69)
-0.0027 *** -0.0027 ***
(4.86) (4.80)
-0.0175
(0.39)
Number of Observations 607 607
R-squared 0.64 0.64
Black
College
Lunch
Attendance
Pupil/Teacher Ratio
Racial Diversity 1990
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
Linguistic Diversity
District Size
Note : Expenditure Per Pupil, Income, Average Teacher Salary, Density, and District 
Size in thousands.
Private School
Absolute value of heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics in parentheses.
Income Diversity
Expenditure Per Pupil   
Income
Density
Table 2.4
Racial Diversity and District Math Scores: Sensitivity Analysis
Average Teacher Salary 
Teacher Inexperience
1 2
Constant
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Employing the coefficient on racial diversity from the third specification, a move from 
racial homogeneity to a score of 0.5 would result in fall in passage rates on the math 
proficiency exam of around 5.5 percentage points.  
A second potential problem is the presence of private schooling. Clotfelter (1976) 
finds that desegregation has a significant effect on private school enrollment. Racial 
integration could lead to lower test scores if integration caused the better students in the 
district to respond by switching to private schools. Thus, our results might be showing 
that racially diverse school districts have lower test scores not because of the effect of 
diversity on the provision of education within the district, but rather because the better 
students in the district are attending private schools. The second column of Table 2.4 
addresses this issue by including the percentage of district children aged 5-17 that attend 
private schools as an independent variable. This 2000 Census variable is not statistically 
significant and, more importantly, does not affect the impact of racial diversity on school 
district performance. Thus while migration to private schools may be a response to 
integration, it is does not influence the relationship between racial diversity and school 
district performance.  
 
2.6  Concluding Thoughts 
In this article, I demonstrate a negative relationship between racial diversity and school 
district performance. A school district moving from perfect racial homogeneity to a 
situation where two racial groups that had equal shares (a racial diversity score of 0.5) 
could expect a decline in district passage rates on the ninth grade math test of between 
5.5 and 16.5 percentage points percentage points. While not insignificant, these results 
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should be taken with a grain of salt as a 0.5 change in a school district’s racial diversity 
score represents a five standard deviation change.  A fairly large one standard deviation 
increase in racial diversity is associated with a much smaller decline in district math test 
scores of between 1.1 and 3.3 percentage points. At the same time, however, these results 
provide the first estimate that the net effect of racial diversity on school performance is 
negative. While the empirical approach here cannot identify the exact channels through 
which racial diversity lowers school performance, identification of the negative 
relationship is an important first step.  
This finding suggests that the opportunity exists for improvement in education 
outcomes in the most racially diverse schools if ways to mitigate the negative effect of 
racial diversity on school district performance can be discovered. It is likely, however, 
that overcoming the effect of racially diversity on school district performance will not be 
easy or desirable, especially given the alternatives. For example, Alesina, Baqir and 
Easterly (1999) note that the results of the ethnic, linguistic, and racial diversity literature 
appear to suggest that the solution to low levels of public goods provision is segregation 
and decentralization. This, however, is not a tenable solution for two reasons. First, 
people value diversity as well as school performance and might be perfectly happy to 
trade-off reduced performance for living in an integrated environment. Maximizing 
school performance is not the same thing as maximizing utility and many factors go into 
deciding where to live and attend school besides school performance (Pritchett and 
Filmer 1999). Second, segregation is not ideal in the long-run if integration increases the 
speed of preference homogenization (Bénabou 1996).   
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My results have three important implications for research on the effects of race on 
academic achievement. First, research into the effect of racial concentration on student 
achievement needs to consider the voting channel as well as the peer effect channel. 
Second, social scientists need to look more closely at the net effect of diversity on student 
achievement. The racial peer effect literature seems to be clear that increased diversity is 
good for black students. What is not clear is whether increased diversity is good for 
students of all racial groups.23 Finally, more work needs to be done on estimating through 
which channels diversity effects operate. Does racial diversity could lead to lower net test 
scores because the negative voting effect dominates the positive peer group effect? Or is 
the voting effect negligible but overall learning lower in diverse districts because there 
are both positive and negative racial peer effects and the negative dominates the 
positive.24 The answers to these important questions await further research.  
                                                 
23 In fact, the relationship between integration and school performance for black students may not 
be linear. Echenique, Fryer, and Kaufman (2006) find that integrated schools often have in-school 
segregation that leads to lower test scores. Schools where more than 25 percent of the students are 
black are actually more segregated in terms of social interactions than schools with fewer black 
students.  
24 Hoxby (2000b) finds that black, Hispanic, and white third graders all do worse academically as 
the percentage of their classmates that are black increase. Her results are consistent with there 
being circumstances where the net effect of increased diversity is negative. The same is true with 
Echenique, Fryer and Kaufman (2006), who find that Asians are more likely to have high test 
scores when they are segregated within a school.  
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Chapter 3 
Does Tiebout Move or Vote? Fiscal 
Competition, Yardstick Competition, and 
Income Tax Use 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In his influential 1956 paper, Charles Tiebout suggested that ‘consumer-voter’ mobility 
among local governments could approximate a competitive market setting if the number 
of local communities was sufficiently large (Goodspeed 1998). Tiebout’s goal was to 
show how local public goods could be provided in a world without politics (Fischel 
2001). Conventional wisdom among public finance economists is that local governments 
do face strong competitive pressures from mobile households (Mieskowski and Zodrow 
1989). ‘Voting with your feet’ is thus commonly viewed as being analogous to voting 
with your pocketbook in conventional market settings, so much that voting at the ballot 
box is often viewed as inconsequential to the level and quality of goods provided by local 
governments. Horizontal competition among governments has been found to improve 
efficiency in a variety of settings.25  
This ‘Tiebout-style’ fiscal competition among local governments is thought to 
limit the ability of local governments to levy non-benefit taxes, i.e., taxes where the level 
                                                 
25 In education there is a large literature showing a positive relationship between the degree of 
interjurisdictional competition among school districts and school efficiency. See, for example, the 
work of Staley and Blair (1995) and Hoxby (2000a). Building off the work of Brennan and 
Buchanan (1980) on constraining Leviathan, Stansel (2006) finds slower government growth in 
more competitive areas. His work is consistent with previous findings of Schneider (1986) and 
Zax (1989). 
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of benefits is not commensurate with level of taxation (Oates 1999).26 The mobility of 
households prevents local governments from engaging in redistribution because mobile 
households will ‘vote with their feet’ and move to a nearby community with less 
redistribution. In this manner, fiscal competition among local governments could also 
affect the tax structure adopted by local governments. Spry (2005) finds that fiscal 
competition for mobile households limits the use of residency-based income taxes. Given 
the widely-held view in public finance that governments should diversify across as many 
tax bases as possible for revenue stability (the so-called ‘three-legged stool’ analogy), 
this finding could have important policy implications. 
This paper provides evidence that horizontal competition among local 
governments does not act as a constraint on the use of residency-based income taxes. 
Caplan (2001) develops a model where the complete capitalization of property taxation 
into home prices means that ‘voting with your feet’ cannot be a way for homeowners to 
escape unwanted taxation.27 Homeowners have to pay the tax regardless, either directly in 
tax payments to the local government, or indirectly, through a lower selling price for their 
home.28 Powell (2004) extends Caplan’s findings to include any tax that is capitalized in 
housing prices.29  
                                                 
26 I use the terminology fiscal competition, interjurisdictional competition, and ‘voting with your 
feet’ interchangeably because all describe the same phenomena where exit to nearby districts 
creates competitive pressure. Yardstick competition is different because the competitive process 
is through ‘voice’, i.e., politics. 
27 See Palmon and Smith (1998) for evidence that property taxes are completely capitalized into 
home prices.  
28 This is because the new owners recognize the future steam of tax payments associated with 
purchasing the home and reduce their willingness to pay by the amount of the discounted future 
tax payments. 
29 An income tax based on a individual’s residence is capitalized into home prices in a manner 
similar to the property tax thus Caplan’s conclusions should hold for the residency-based school 
district income tax examined here. 
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Caplan (2001) argues that it is the political process that forces local governments 
to conform to the preferences of the median voter, not interjurisdictional competition. My 
argument is similar, except that here other local governments are important, not as a 
means of escape, but as a means of comparison. I argue that yardstick competition among 
local governments is a significant factor in the choice of an income tax. Yardstick 
competition, formalized by Besley and Case (1995), suggests that voters in one locality 
utilize information from surrounding localities in making their decisions. In an approach 
similar to the one employed here, Fiva and Rattsø (2007) find that yardstick competition 
helps explain local government adoption of the property tax in Norway.  
The empirical approach used to identify yardstick competition has the added 
benefit of providing unbiased estimates of the effect of fiscal competition among 
governments. In the presence of spatial dependence, non-spatial estimates can be biased, 
inconsistent, or both (Anselin 1988), thus a finding of spatial interaction casts doubt on 
the robustness of variable such as measures of interjurisdictional competition that are 
correlated in space. Brasington (2007) demonstrates that failing to account for spatial 
dependence among local governments can lead to an upward bias in empirical estimates 
of interjurisdictional competition. The statistical and economic significance of fiscal 
competition measures often disappear once spatial dependence among local governments 
is properly taken into account. 
This paper shows that yardstick competition matters in the choice of whether or 
not to adopt a residency-based income tax using data on Ohio school districts. This 
institutional context was chosen so as to be directly comparable with past research that 
finds a significant negative relationship between fiscal competition and tax instruments 
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choice (Spry 2005). In addition, I find that failure to account for spatial dependence in tax 
instrument choice has biased previous estimates, most notably measures of competition 
among local governments. The negative influence of interjurisdictional competition on 
income tax usage disappears once spatial dependence is taken into account.    
Section 2 presents an overview of the institutional setting and the data. Section 3 
provides a first look at possible yardstick competition in the data. Section 4 discusses the 
empirical approach adopted to meet the two goals of this paper and then Section 5 
follows with the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.   
  
3.2 Data  
To investigate the relative role of ‘voting with one’s feet’ and yardstick competition in 
the determination of local government tax structure, I look at a cross-section of Ohio 
school districts for the 1996-1997 school year.30 Ohio is one of only two states that allow 
school districts to choose between a property tax and an income tax. Thus the data set 
presents a unique opportunity to study the impact of yardstick and interjurisdictional 
competition on local government tax structure. While Ohio school districts are required 
to raise revenue through property taxation, in 1989 the Ohio state government gave 
school districts the option of also levying a residency-based income tax. (Busch, Stewart, 
and Taub 1999). That first year 17 school districts received voter approval to tax income 
and by the 1996-97 school year 119 of the 611 school districts in the state used the 
income tax.  
                                                 
30 As this paper is, in part inspired by and a comment on the work of Spry (2005), the year of 
analysis and variable choices are initially chosen so as to be as directly comparable to his results 
as possible.   
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The dependent variable for the analysis is a binary variable equaling one if a 
school district utilized an income tax during the 1996-97 school year and zero if a school 
district did not. Following Spry (2005), fiscal competition or ‘voting with one’s feet’ is 
measured as the number of other school districts within ten miles of a district.31 This 
variable can be thought of as representing the ‘cost’ of voting with one’s feet. As the 
number of nearby districts increases, the cost of finding a nearby district to move to falls 
and reduces the ability of localities to extract revenue from high-income taxpayers. Thus 
the hypothesized relationship between the number of districts within 10 miles and the use 
of the income tax is negative.32  
 I follow Spry (2005) in my choice of explanatory variables in order to facilitate 
direct comparison of estimated parameter coefficients. Of primary importance in the 
choice of tax structure is the ability to export the tax burden of education onto non-
residents, since they cannot vote in district elections. As the income tax is residency-
based, the entire burden of the tax falls on district residents unlike the burden of the 
property tax which can be exported to some extent onto non-resident landowners and 
consumers. For example, Norstrand (1980) and Sjoquist (1981) find that local 
governments are more likely to use the property tax when it is viewed as being exported 
onto non-residents. The percentage of taxable property that is business property 
(commercial, industrial, or public utility) is included to measure the ability of a 
community to export the property tax burden. The greater the percentage of property 
                                                 
31 Originally calculated by Spry (2005), the variable is measured as the number of districts whose 
geographic center is ten miles from the geographic center of the district being analyzed.  
32 Another measure of interjurisdictional competition that is frequently used is a Herfindahl index 
measuring the local government’s share of the total city or MSA government in terms of 
population or land area. Hall (2006) confirms Spry’s (2005) finding that Tiebout mobility matters 
using a similar data set but measuring the degree of interjurisdictional competition using a 
Herfindahl index.   
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within a school district that is business, the lower the probability should be that it would 
use the income tax since doing so for any fixed level of spending would likely increase 
the burden on local voters. The percentage of taxable property that is mineral is included 
for similar reasons and with similar expectations regarding its sign. 
 The percentage of property that is in agricultural use is included to account for the 
fact that farmers are generally property-rich but income-poor and thus would likely vote 
for an income tax over a property tax of a similar amount.33 Shock (2004-2005) analyzes 
voting behavior in over 1,200 school district elections in Ohio and finds that the 
percentage of agricultural property strongly predicts the passage of an income tax.  A 
positive relationship is also expected between the percentage of a school district’s 
residents that are renters and the school district income tax. Shock (2004-2005) finds this 
relationship in his study of voting behavior but Spry (2005) finds the opposite 
relationship (although the finding is not statistically significant).   
 There is a large literature showing the effect of the elderly on school spending 
(Button 1992; Poterba 1997; Berkman and Plutzer, 2004; Brunner and Baldson 2004). 
There are two reasons to think that elderly voters would be in favor of an income tax. 
First, elderly homeowners are likely to see their tax burden fall when the income tax is 
used because senior citizens tend to have lower incomes and higher property values. 
Second, elderly homeowners are more likely than the average homeowner to own their 
home outright. Thus their property tax payments are lump-sum payments to the auditor 
instead of being collected with their mortgage payment and being held in escrow. The 
fiscal illusion created by paying property taxes together with the mortgage is reduced for 
                                                 
33 The classification of property that is excluded to prevent singularity is the percentage of 
property that is residential.  
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many elderly taxpayers, thus they may be more anti-property tax than would be explained 
by the first reason. 
 From the perspective of the median voter, the likelihood of an income tax being 
utilized is expected to decline as the ‘price’ of the income tax increases to the median 
voter. The income tax price for the median voter is calculated by multiplying one 
thousand times the median adjusted gross income in a school district divided by the total 
adjusted gross income in the school district. The higher the income tax price to the 
median voter, the less likely it is that a school district will utilize the income tax. The 
median voter pays property taxes as well, thus the property tax price of taxation is likely 
to influence the adoption of an income tax. The property tax price is calculated as the 
median price of owner-occupied housing in the school district times the residential 
assessment ratio divided by total property tax value in the district.34 As the property tax 
price to the median voter increases, use of the income tax is expected to increase.  
 The final two explanatory variables included in the benchmark analysis are 
variables used in previous research: the percentage of district residents that live in a rural 
area, and a binary variable equaling one if the school district is located inside a local 
government that also levies a local income tax.35 Rural residency is thought to be 
positively correlated with the adoption of a school district income tax beyond being 
involved in agriculture although a theoretical reason has not yet been given. Perhaps non-
farmer rural voters tend to identify with the interests of their neighbors engaged in 
                                                 
34 In Ohio, the assessment ratio on real property is 35 percent. Homes are appraised every six 
years in Ohio at full market value, thus 35 percent of the full market value of a home represents 
its taxable value.   
35 The borders of school districts and municipal governments in Ohio are not contiguous, thus this 
measure is imprecise because it only reflects if a portion of school district residents have to pay a 
municipal income tax. Unfortunately, the data do not exist to calculate a more precise figure. 
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agriculture, or are like the elderly in that they tend to have more property than income. 
The binary variable called ‘city tax’ is thought to measure competition among local 
governments for the income tax base. The expected sign on this variable is ambiguous. 
Spry (2005) makes the case that the expected relationship is negative because use of the 
income tax by local cities would ‘crowd out’ attempts by the school district to adopt the 
tax. He finds, however, that the relationship between the city tax and the school district 
tax is positive. This finding is not inconsistent with yardstick competition in that voters 
observing an income tax in use at the municipal level have information on its positives 
and negatives. If the benefits outweigh the positives, the relationship between city tax and 
school district income tax adoption will be positive.  
 The data come from three sources. Demographic variables on school district 
residents were obtained from the National Center for Education Statistics (1994) ‘School 
District Data Book.’36 The publication tabulates school district information for all U.S. 
school districts from answers on the 1990 Census long form. Data on assessed valuation 
by property type and school district income tax information comes from various 
publications of the Ohio Department of Taxation (2007) and the Ohio Department of 
Education (2007).37 The number of school districts within 10 miles was calculated by 
Spry (2005) using Geographic Information System maps from the U.S. Census Bureau. 
Data on the median home value and median income in a school district, used to calculate 
                                                 
36 The original school district data book came on 44 CD-ROMs from the National Center for 
Education Statistics. The National Bureau of Economic Research has purchased and made 
available a more user-friendly version of the data at: www.nber.org/sddb/. 
37 A full description of the publications used to calculate the fiscal variables can be found in Spry 
(2005, Table 1), but this data appears to now be exclusively available online at: 
www.tax.ohio.gov/divisions/tax_analysis/tax_data_series/school_district_data/publications_tds_s
chool.stm. 
 42
the property-tax price and income tax price variables, were obtained from the Ohio 
Department of Education (2007). Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for the variables. 
Variable Mean Min Max
School District Income Tax 0.20 0 1 0.397
Number of Districts Within 10 Miles 4.21 0 19 3.536
Business Property % 0.36 0.050 0.88 0.146
Mineral Property % 0.00 0 0.04 0.005
Agricultural Property % 0.11 0 0.47 0.107
Renters % 0.24 0.051 1 0.099
Elderly % 0.23 0 0.45 0.055
Income Tax Price 0.40 0.004 41.67 1.746
Property Tax Price 0.24 0 2.54 0.233
Rural % 0.54 0 1 0.413
City Tax 0.64 0 1 0.481
Standard 
Deviation
Summary Statistics for Ohio School Districts, 1996-97 School Year
Table 3.1  
 
 
3.3 Follow My Neighbor: A First Look 
Figure 3.1 shows a map of Ohio school districts. The grey districts are those that were 
using the school district income tax to raise revenue during the 1996-1997 school year. 
As noted by Spry (2005), the school district income tax appears to be clustered primarily 
in rural areas with less interjursidictional competition. This would appear to be consistent 
with the income tax being adopted in locations where there is a greater cost to ‘voting 
with your feet.’  
A process where district residents observe an income tax in use in nearby districts 
and vote for its adoption in their home district is consistent with this clustering of districts 
as well. The previous literature has found a positive relationship between the property tax 
price the median homeowner faces and the probability of adopting an income tax. 
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Districts with high property tax prices and without other factors found to depress income 
tax adoption such as a large amount of business tax property were likely to have been 
‘first adopters’ when Ohio’s school districts were first given the ability to tax income in 
1989.   
Figure 3.1 
Ohio School Districts with an Income Tax, 1997 
 
Note: Districts in gray are those using the school district income tax during the 1996-97 school year. 
 
A good example of this would be in Mercer County in the western part of Ohio on 
the Indiana border. The first district in the area to adopt an income tax was the Coldwater 
school district in 1990. The property tax price facing the median homeowner in 
 44
Coldwater was 0.71, two standard deviations above the state mean. In 1991, neighboring 
Fort Recovery joined them in using the income tax (property tax price 0.45). Two other 
neighboring districts with property tax prices of 0.36 and 0.09 joined them in 1996. Thus, 
by 1997 four out of the six school districts in the county had adopted a school district 
income tax. 
Figure 3.2 graphically presents this adoption process for Mercer County with the 
number of districts in the county is presented on the y-axis and the year is on the x-axis. 
The figure shows that as time progresses from 1989, the number of districts in the county 
using an income tax to raise revenue goes from zero to four.  
 
Figure 3.2 
Income Tax Use in Mercer County, 1989-1997 
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Figures 3.3-3.5 present a similar graphical analysis of income tax adoption over 
time for three additional counties where the income tax is prevalent. The same pattern 
holds. Figure 3.5, for example, shows Miami County (near Cincinnati) starting with zero 
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districts using the income tax in 1989 and having one district adopt an income tax per 
year until 1994. 
 
Figure 3.3 
Income Tax Use in Darke County, 1989-1997 
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Figure 3.4 
Income Tax Use in Miami County, 1989-1997 
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 Note that yardstick competition clearly is not the only factor leading to adoption 
of an income tax. If it was, then the income tax would eventually spread to all school 
districts in Ohio. The factors that are negatively related to income tax adoption, such as 
the ability to export part of the tax burden through the taxation of business property, 
limits the geographic spread of income tax usage. In Miami County, for example, the 
remaining districts that have not adopted the income tax since 1996 have either a very 
high income tax ‘price’ or the district has a lot of business property (or both). 
Figure 3.5 
Income Tax Use in Putnam County, 1989-1997 
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 The spatial relationship presented in Figure 3.1 showing the usage of the school 
district income tax in 1997 presents a picture consistent with spatial dependence in the 
choice of an income tax. The graphical time-series evidence presented in Figures 3.2-3.5 
provides evidence of yardstick competition in the adoption of the income tax as usage of 
the income tax seems to spread geographically within a county over time. While not 
proof of yardstick competition in the use of the income tax, these cases are suggestive of 
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such a relationship. At the same time, they are not incompatible with there being a 
negative relationship between fiscal competition and income tax adoption. To further 
isolate statistically the importance of yardstick and fiscal competition in the choice of an 
income tax the remainder of the paper discusses and presents an economic analysis 
isolating these effects.  
 
3.4 Empirical Approach 
The traditional approach to answering the question of the effect of interjurisdictional 
competition on income tax adoption would begin by estimating a standard probit model 
of the form:  
εββα +++= ∑
=
ix
X
x
xii ZWITHINSDIT ,
1
1 10     (1) 
where SDIT is the binary variable identifying if school district i levied a school district 
income tax during the 1996-97 school year; WITHIN10 is the number of school districts 
within ten miles of school district i; and Zi is a vector of the remaining explanatory 
variables representing other demographic and financial variables at the school district 
level. The coefficient of primary interest is 1β , because it measures the effect of Tiebout 
competition on the tax structure adopted by school districts. This is the approach adopted 
by Spry (2005). 
 If there is no spatial dependence among school districts, the estimation of 
equation (1) by log-likelihood is appropriate. If, however, the likelihood of a school 
district adopting an income tax is in part a function of whether one’s neighbors have 
adopted an income tax, then the results of the standard probit analysis can be biased, 
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inconsistent, or both (Anselin 1988). The geographic pattern of income tax adoption 
visible in Figure 3.1 is consistent with there being spatial dependence in the dependent 
variable. Brasington (2007) has found that the failure to control for spatial dependence in 
education production functions leads to estimates of the effect of interjurisdictional 
competition on outcomes being overstated. More generally, failure to take into account 
actual spatial dependence potentially biases all parameter estimates and voids subsequent 
hypothesis testing. Thus the empirical approach described here not only detects yardstick 
competition among local school districts but also corrects for potential bias and erroneous 
findings of significance resulting from uncorrected spatial dependence. 
Here I address this potential problem by using two different models of spatial 
dependence. The first model is a Bayesian version of what is commonly referred to as a 
spatial probit lag model or spatial autoregressive probit model (SARP).38 A general 
overview of the SARP model can be found in LeSage (1999) but the basic idea can be 
obtained by analogy to an autoregressive (AR) model in time-series analysis. Just as an 
AR model includes lags over time to reflect that fact that a dependent variable might be 
influenced by its own value in previous periods, the SARP model includes lags over 
geographic space. In the context of school districts, one spatial lag from district i would 
encompass all contiguous neighbors, with each subsequent lag enveloping the neighbors 
of district i’s neighbors.  
The estimating equation for the SARP model is very similar to the traditional 
probit model with one exception:  
                                                 
38 This is sometimes called a ‘spatial latent variable approach.’ See, for example, Fiva and Rattsø 
(2007) or Rincke (2006). 
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 εββρα +++⋅⋅+= ∑
=
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X
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1
1 10               (2) 
The primary difference between the traditional probit model and the SARP mode is the 
SDITW ⋅⋅ρ term. The W is a ‘spatial weight matrix,’ a symmetrical matrix that 
summarizes the spatial configuration of Ohio school districts on a map.39 The number of 
rows and columns in the matrix is determined by the number of school districts in Ohio, 
in this case 607.40 For each school district in the sample the matrix specifies that district’s 
geographic neighbors based on first-degree contiguity.41 For example, if the school 
district in row one had only two geographic neighbors, its neighbors would receive ones 
in their respective columns. All other columns for row one are given zeros as they 
represent the district itself or non-contiguous neighbors. Before being employed in 
regression analysis the weight matrix is standardized so that each row equals unity with 
each contiguous neighbor receiving equal weight. So for the school district represented in 
row one with two contiguous neighbors, each neighbor would have a weight of 0.5. A 
district with three neighbors would each receive a weight of 0.33, and so on. This is done 
for interpretation reasons. 
 If ρ, the coefficient on the spatial weight matrix, is statistically different from zero 
there is evidence of spatial dependence in the dependent variable. The estimate of spatial 
dependence can be thought of as the reaction function of a school district to its own 
characteristics and the use of the school district income tax in nearby districts (Brueckner 
and Saavedra 2001). Theoretically, yardstick competition can result in the reaction 
                                                 
39 LeSage (1997) provides a good overview of the construction of weight matrixes. 
40 While Ohio had 611 school districts during the 1996-97 school year, four districts had to be 
excluded from the analysis because of missing or censored data. 
41 There are many other possible weight matrixes. First degree contiguity is the most popular. 
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function being either positive or negative depending upon parameter estimates, thus 
empirical evidence is necessary to determine if the presence of an income tax in 
neighboring districts has a positive or negative effect on use of the income tax. Following 
Fiva and Rattsø (2007), a value of ρ statistically different from zero is taken as evidence 
that yardstick competition matters in the choice of the income tax by school districts.  
 The Bayesian SARP model is employed to deal with heteroscedasticity introduced 
by the non-spherical variance-covariance matrix created by the SARP. In his survey of 
different methods of dealing with heteroskedasticity in discrete dependent variable spatial 
models, Fleming (2004) concludes that the Bayesian approach pioneered by LeSage 
(2000) is the superior approach to dealing with this problem. The advantage of the 
Bayesian approach is that it allows for heteroskedastic error terms while making sure that 
heteroskedasticity is not leading to inconsistent parameters. An excellent overview of the 
Bayesian SARP model can be found in Fiva and Rattsø (2007).   
The Bayesian SARP method developed (and explained in greater detail) by 
LeSage (2000) is a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method using a Gibbs Sampler 
process, which is repeated a large number off times to obtain conditional distributions for 
the model parameters. The Gibbs Sampler process requires a large number of ‘draws’ to 
derive conditional distributions for all the parameters. According to MCMC convergence 
diagnostics the process converges after roughly 950 draws with the first 15 ‘burned-off’ 
to allow the sampler to reach a steady-state. The results here are all based on 1000 draws 
with the first 50 excluded.42 
                                                 
42 As a check on the MCMC diagnostics, the baseline model specifications in Table 2 were run 
with 5,000, 10,000, and 20,000 draws and the parameter estimates were basically unchanged. 
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Relying on a finding that ρ is non-zero and significant in the SARP model as 
evidence of yardstick competition is problematic since the SARP model assumes that the 
variance-covariance matrix of the error term is not spatially dependent. Spatial 
dependence can arise in the error term for many reasons, however, and thus the finding of 
yardstick competition might be a ‘false positive’. A frequent cause of false positive is 
omitted variable bias caused by an incorrect model specification. Omitted variable bias 
will not create a false positive if the omitted variables are not spatially dependent. If, 
however, the omitted variables are spatially dependent then they will be picked up in the 
error term. Failure to account for spatial error dependence can give rise to the false 
positive because the spatial lag term ρ is likely to reflect the uncorrected for spatial error 
correlation created by the omitted variables.43 In the case of the linear spatial model there 
exist several approaches to addressing this problem.44 Unfortunately, these approaches 
are not valid for spatially limited dependent variable models (Fiva and Rattsø 2007). 
The second model of spatial dependence employed, the spatial Durbin model, 
overcomes this problem. Pace and LeSage (2007) find that estimates from the spatial 
Durbin model are not affected by spatial dependence in the error term or the dependent or 
independent variables. They conclude that the ability of the spatial Durbin model to deal 
with this omitted variable bias provides a strong econometric motivation for its use. Here 
I employ a Bayesian probit version of the model, called the Spatial Durbin Probit (SDP) 
model, which takes the following form:  
εδββρα ++++⋅⋅+= ∑∑
==
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1
,,
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1 10     (3) 
                                                 
43 See Brueckner and Saavedra (2001, 212) for further discussion of this issue. 
44 Anselin (2002) provides an overview of these procedures.  
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In equation (3), the second xZ matrix is the still the matrix of independent variables only 
this time it is multiplied by the spatial weight matrix. In this manner the term corrects for 
spatial dependence in the independent variables as well as in the dependent variable. The 
xδ coefficients thus pick up the extent to which the demographic variables of nearby 
districts influence the decision to adopt an income tax in the original school district. This 
approach significantly reduces bias in cross-section results by eliminating spatially 
dependent omitted variable bias (Pace, Barry, and Sirmans 1998; Brasington and Hite 
2005; Pace and LeSage 2007).45 In the presence of spatial dependence in the error term, 
this will be the appropriate specification.46  
 
3.5 Empirical Results 
The first objective of the empirical analysis is to test for yardstick competition among 
school districts in the choice of the income tax. Recall that if ρ is statistically different 
than zero than this will be taken as evidence of yardstick competition. If yardstick 
competition is observed, then it is also likely that the estimated coefficients from 
traditional probit analyses of tax instrument choice are biased. Thus the second goal of 
the empirical analysis is to see, conditional on their being spatial dependence, how the 
                                                 
45 Non-spatially dependent omitted variable bias is still possible, but since the explanatory 
variables are the same for the original district as well as the neighbors, most omitted variable bias 
is likely to be spatially dependent.  
46 There exists a model specifically to correct for spatial error only, the SEM model. Mur and 
Angulo (2005) show that the SDP model accomplishes the same thing as a SEM model with the 
advantage that it sorts out individual effects in the disturbance term through the use of the 
spatially lagged independent variables.  The SEM model is more frequently used in the literature; 
this is primarily because the SDP model is prone to multicollinearity. Fortunately, analysis of the 
BKW (Belsley, Kuhn, and Welsch 1980) influential observation diagnostics finds that 
multicollinearity is not a problem. 
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conclusions from previous studies on fiscal competition and tax instrument choice are 
changed once spatial dependence is fully taken into account. I first estimate the non-
spatial probit model similar to the previous literature and then the SARP and SDP 
models. Table 3.2 presents the results of these benchmark regressions.  
 As with regular probit estimation, the coefficients in Table 3.2 are difficult to 
interpret. The marginal effect of a change in each independent variable in the probability 
that a school district has an income tax is provided to help with interpretation. In spatial 
models, the spatial interdependence among observations needs to be corrected for 
because a change in the explanatory variable has both a direct and indirect effect.47 The 
marginal effects for all spatial models presented in the paper take the ‘spatial multiplier 
effect’ into account. The marginal effect of a one standard deviation change in each 
independent variable are also calculated and provided in Appendix Table 1 for additional 
ease of interpretation.  
The non-spatial probit results in column 1 are nearly identical to the previous 
literature and are generally consistent with prior expectations.48 Business property 
percentage and mineral property percentage are negatively related to the adoption of an 
income tax in a statistically significant manner and the property tax price, the presence of 
a city income tax, and the percentage of agricultural property are statistically significant 
and positively related to the probability of income tax adoption.  
 
                                                 
47 See Beron and Vijverberg (2004, 174-175) for further explanation of the interpretation of probit 
parameters in the spatial context. Basically, the indirect effect arises because a district’s decision 
to adopt an income tax determines how your neighbors feel about an income tax, which in turn 
affects how the original district feels, which affects the neighboring districts, etc.  
48 This should not be surprising as the only difference between Spry (2005) and the present paper 
are two observations excluded because of missing data. 
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Variable
Constant -0.711 -0.149 -0.223 -0.026 -0.847 -0.236
(1.267) (0.679) (1.373)
Within 10 -0.093 *** -0.019 -0.143 *** -0.019 -0.058 -0.016
(2.713) (0.047) (0.072)
Property Tax Price 1.264 *** 0.265 1.781 *** 0.248 0.863 * 0.241
(2.202) (0.686) (0.531)
Income Tax Price -0.333 -0.070 -0.539 *** -0.069 -0.091 -0.025
(1.291) (0.305) (0.112)
% Renters -0.010 -0.002 -0.310 -0.035 1.069 0.298
(0.009) (1.334) (1.552)
City Tax Dummy 0.598 *** 0.126 0.713 *** 0.112 0.412 ** 0.115
(3.698) (0.204) (0.238)
% Senior Citizens -1.249 -0.262 -1.783 -0.352 0.197 0.055
(0.854) (1.992) (2.225)
% of Agricultural Property 2.901 *** 0.609 2.772 ** 0.502 2.321 * 0.647
(2.861) (1.434) (1.558)
% of Mineral Property -53.264 *** -11.175 -70.338 *** -11.496 -19.279 -5.377
(2.909) (26.522) (33.232)
% of Business Property -1.818 *** -0.382 -2.357 *** -0.388 -1.775 ** -0.495
(2.618) (0.833) (0.957)
% of Rural Residents 0.273 0.057 0.232 0.303 0.471 0.132
(0.835) (0.429) (0.469)
Spatial Lag Term ρ 0.261 *** 0.144 *
(0.061) (0.097)
Lag % Agriculture 5.537 **
(3.194)
Yes
Number of Observations 607 607 607
Psuedo R-squared 0.23 0.77 0.65
Non-Spatial 
Probit
Marginal 
Effect
Fiscal Competition and Tax Instrument Choice: Model Comparisons
Table 3.2 
Marginal 
Effect
SDP 
Model
Dependent variable: Binary Variable Equaling 1 if Taxing Income
SARP 
Model
Marginal 
Effect
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
In Column 1 the numbers in parentheses are absolute t-statistics. In Columns 2 and 3, posterior 
standard deviations. Insignificant spatially lagged independent variables supressed for space.
Other Spatially Lagged X's
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The results of the SARP model in Column 2 are very similar. The primary 
exception is that the income tax price is now positive and statistically significant at the 
one percent level where it was insignificant (but positive) in the non-spatial probit. This 
could be as a result of the spatial lag correcting for bias, but it is likely the result of the 
Bayesian approach employed in estimating the SARP model. The Bayesian component of 
the SARP model attempts to not fit extreme outliers which appear to be driving the 
insignificant result for income tax price in Column 1. Estimating Column 1 with a non-
spatial Bayesian probit confirms this as the income tax price becomes significant.49 
The spatial lag term ρ in the SARP model has a coefficient of 0.261 and is 
significantly different than zero, indicating the presence of yardstick competition. The 
coefficient suggests that the average correlation between a district’s choice of an income 
tax and the weighted average of its neighboring districts choice of an income tax is 0.261. 
Unfortunately since the spatial lag term ρ is the coefficient of an unobserved latent 
variable the marginal effects of neighboring districts use of an income tax on the 
probability of the home district adopting an income tax cannot be calculated (Rincke 
2006).  
What about the measure of fiscal competition? The number of school districts 
within ten miles is negatively and statistically significant related to the probability of 
using the income tax, appearing to confirm that as the amount of interjurisdictional 
competition increases uses of the income tax declines. The results from the SARP model 
in the second column seem to confirm the negative relationship. The number of districts 
                                                 
49 Income tax price seemed to be the only result driven by outliers as all other estimates remain 
essentially unchanged in the non-spatial Bayesian probit.  
 56
in ten miles in negative and significant and the marginal effect of the variable is the same 
as in the traditional, non-spatial, probit model.  
Column 3 presents the results from the SDP model. Recall that spatial Durbin 
model controls for spatially dependent omitted variable bias by including the weighted 
average of neighboring districts independent variables as well as the dependent variable. 
The spatial lag of the percentage of property that is agricultural is significant at the five 
percent level providing strong evidence of spatial dependence. In addition, the lag of the 
percentage of mineral property barely misses being statistically significant and is quite 
large. Controlling for omitted variable bias in the spatially lagged dependent variables 
greatly reduces the explanatory power of many of the independent variables. Importantly, 
however, the spatial lag term is still positive and statistically significant at the ten percent 
level, suggesting that the finding of yardstick competition in the SARP regression was 
not spurious.  
Most notably, failure to control for spatially dependent omitted variable bias most 
likely gave too much explanatory power to the measure of fiscal competition as the 
number of districts within ten miles is now statistically insignificant. In addition, the SDP 
model results suggest that failure to control for spatial dependence in the error term was 
introducing an upward bias in the size of the parameter estimate. Controlling for spatial 
dependence reduces the size of the coefficient estimate on the number of districts within 
ten miles by over 50 percent. These results are consistent with Brasington’s (2007) 
research on interjurisdictional competition and education production. He finds that 
coefficient estimates on measures of interjurisdictional competition are statistically 
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significant in spatial lag models but that those results disappear in once spatial error 
dependence is taken into account.  
The effect of controlling for spatial dependence in the error term can perhaps be 
seen most prominently in the calculation of marginal effects. For example, not only is 
mineral property percentage no longer statistically significant, but the marginal effect of 
the variable is less than half of the estimate in either the SARP model or the regular 
probit. Appendix Table 2 provides a calculation of the marginal effect a one standard 
deviation change in the a school districts mineral property percentage is estimated to 
reduce the probability of adopting an income tax by two and a half percentage points, half 
of what is predicted in the SARP or standard probit models (Appendix 2). The 
importance of not relying solely on parameter coefficients can be seen in the case of the 
business property percentage. The estimated parameter coefficient is smaller in the SDP 
regression that in the SARP regression, but the marginal effect is now larger. Looking at 
Appendix 2, we can see that a one standard deviation change in the percentage of 
business property in a school district will reduce the probability that a district will use the 
income tax by 7.5 percent, an estimate over 1.5 percentage points higher than similar 
calculation from the SARP model.  
Other items of interest are that the income tax price is no longer statistically 
significant once spatial error dependence is taken into account with the SDP model. The 
marginal effect of a one standard deviation change in the income tax price is reduced by 
nearly two-thirds over the other two models. Although the variables are not significant, it 
should be noted that the percentage of renters and the percentage of senior citizens in a 
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school district both changed signs in the SDP model with both now being positive, which 
is what theory would predict.  
The finding that fiscal competition does not matter once spatial dependence is 
taken into account might be a function of how the degree of interjurisdictional 
competition is defined. In addition to the number of school districts within ten miles, 
Spry (2005) also estimates the number of districts within 12 and 15 miles. Another 
definition of fiscal competition frequently used in the literature is a Herfindahl index of 
market concentration (see, for example, Borland and Howsen (1996) or Hoxby (2000a)). 
Here the Herfindahl index takes the form of: 
∑
=
−=
J
j
jmSHERF
1
21            (4) 
where jms  is equal to district j’s share of school enrollment in county m.  Using this 
formulation a ‘monopoly’ county will have a value of 0 and as perfectly competitive 
county would have a score of one. 
 Table 3.3 presents the results of these alternative regressions employing the 
Bayesian SDP model and the same specifications as in Table 3.2 but substituting these 
three alternative definitions of interjurisdictional competition for the number of districts 
within ten miles. As can be seen in the table, changing the definition of fiscal competition 
does not change the results. In all three specifications the new variables are statistically 
insignificant. In the case of the within 12 and within 15 miles measures, the marginal 
effect is smaller compared to the within 10 mile measures as well. This is to be expected 
given the usual assumption that farther away districts would be weaker substitutes.  
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Variable
Constant -1.166 -0.297 -0.700 -0.217 0.560 0.142
(1.315) (1.493) (1.932)
Within 12 -0.005 -0.001
(0.070)
Within 15 -0.004 -0.001
(0.052)
Herfindahl Index -0.252 -0.064
(0.815)
Property Tax Price 0.904 * 0.230 0.823 * 0.255 0.851 * 0.216
(0.688) (0.768) (0.565)
Income Tax Price -0.222 * -0.056 -0.176 -0.055 -0.112 -0.029
(0.387) (0.472) (0.138)
% Renters 1.308 0.333 1.007 0.312 0.943 0.239
(1.520) (1.618) (1.495)
City Tax Dummy 0.437 ** 0.111 0.461 ** 0.143 0.447 ** 0.113
(0.231) (0.240) (0.232)
% Senior Citizens -0.600 -0.153 -0.136 -0.042 0.014 0.003
(2.309) (2.36) (2.341)
% of Agricultural Property 2.473 ** 0.629 2.399 * 0.742 2.355 * 0.597
(1.531) (1.476) (1.458)
% of Mineral Property -14.604 -3.717 -19.197 -5.939 -24.593 -6.235
(30.232) (32.124) (32.067)
% of Business Property -1.840 ** -0.468 -2.056 ** -0.636 -1.861 ** -0.472
(0.918) (0.984) (0.901)
% of Rural Residents 0.570 0.145 0.484 0.150 0.448 0.114
(0.474) (0.490) (0.443)
Spatial Lag Term ρ 0.145 * 0.161 * 0.140 *
(0.096) (0.098) (0.096)
Spatially Lagged X's Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 607 607 607
Psuedo R-squared 0.70 0.69 0.68
Marginal 
Effect
SDP Model
Dependent variable: Binary Variable Equaling 1 if Taxing Income
SDP Model
Marginal 
Effect
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
In Column 1 the numbers in parentheses are absolute t-statistics. In Columns 2 and 3, posterior 
standard deviations. Spatially Lagged independent variables included in Bayesian Durbin Probit but 
supressed for space. Results consistent with 3rd Column of Table 2.
SDP Model 
Marginal 
Effect
 Fiscal Competition and Tax Instrument Choice: Robustness Checks
Table 3.3
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Even if these new measures of fiscal competition were statistically significant, a one 
standard deviation in each of the measures is estimated to have an extremely small effect 
on the probability of adopting an income tax — between six-tenths for the number of 
districts within 12 miles and one percent for the Herfindahl measure.  
Thus there appears to be little evidence that fiscal competition plays a role in the 
tax structure of local school districts once spatial dependence is properly addressed.50 In 
addition, the spatial lag term is statistically significant in all three specifications, with 
spatial lag estimates ranging from 0.140 to 0.161, providing further evidence to support 
the finding of yardstick competition in the choice of an income tax.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This paper finds evidence of yardstick competition in the choice of Ohio school districts 
to adopt an income tax. The parameter on the spatial lag term estimating the degree of 
yardstick competition varied from 0.140 to 0.161 across the appropriate specifications. 
These findings suggest that the probability of passing an income tax is higher in school 
districts whose neighbors already utilize the income tax.  
 The influence of fiscal competition on the choice among property and income 
taxes is the focus of recent empirical research by Spry (2005). He finds a negative 
relationship between the degree of interjurisdictional competition and the use of an 
income tax by Ohio school districts. After controlling for spatial dependence in the 
                                                 
50 In unreported regressions available from the author, I utilize the weight matrix used by 
Brasington (2007) that measures a school district’s five nearest neighbors. The findings are 
qualitatively similar using this alternative weighting matrix. 
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dependent variable, independent variables, and the error term I find that no statistically 
significant relationship exists.  
In terms of policy, the findings are straightforward. The degree of 
interjurisdictional competition is not what is preventing the use of the income tax in Ohio 
school districts. A ‘race to the bottom’ form of tax competition where school districts in 
competitive metropolitan areas compete for mobile high-income taxpayers can thus be 
ruled out. Instead, the reasons why school districts in Ohio do not adopt an income tax 
appear to be rational responses to the preferences of the median voter. If there is a lot of 
business property in the district, voters prefer the property tax to the income tax, other 
things equal, because of tax burden exportation. In areas with a lot of agricultural 
property, voters prefer to adopt an income tax, since farmers usually own more property 
than the average citizen but realize less income.  
 More importantly, my findings are consistent with Brasington (2007) who first 
showed that interjurisdictional effects are biased when spatial dependence is not 
accounted for.  Researchers looking into the effect of interjurisdictional competition on 
various outcomes need to account for spatial dependence among governments in order to 
avoid having biased, inefficient, and inconsistent parameter estimates. In addition to 
adding to the explanatory power of the models, the use of spatial econometrics also led to 
significantly more accurate parameter estimates.  
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Chapter 4 
Institutions, Capital, and Growth 
 
 
4.1 Introduction51 
The causes of economic development have been studied before Adam Smith made his 
inquiry into the causes of the wealth of nations. As a field of study, however, economic 
development did not really exist until after World War II (Arndt 1997). The first 
development economists focused primarily on the accumulation of physical capital as the 
driving force in economic growth.52 For example, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Sir Arthur 
Lewis, and Walt Rostow all argued that developing countries suffered from a ‘poverty 
trap’ where they could not afford to save enough to accumulate the necessary amounts of 
human capital to grow (Easterly 2006a). This focus on the accumulation of physical 
capital provided the intellectual impetus for the large sums of foreign aid provided to 
developing countries by international aid agencies post World War II because aid was 
seen as being crucial to giving poor nations the physical capital they needed to break out 
of the ‘poverty trap.’ The notion that developing countries are in a poverty trap that 
prevents them from accumulating physical capital is still alive today, both in the actions 
of the World Bank and IMF as well as in the research of economists such as Jeffrey 
Sachs.53  
                                                 
51 This essay draws heavily from a working paper with Russell S. Sobel titled “Institutions, 
Capital, and Growth.” 
52 One notable exception is Peter Bauer (1948; 1954; 1957) who viewed the accumulation of 
capital as an outcome of successful economic performance, not an input.  
53 For example, in his book The End of Poverty, Jeffrey Sachs (2005, 56-57) says “This is the 
main reason why the poorest of the poor are most prone to becoming trapped with low or 
negative economic growth rates. They are too poor to save for the future and thereby accumulate 
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In the 1960s and 70s, the pioneering work of Schultz (1961) and Becker (1964) 
on human capital caused development economists to augment their standard economic 
growth models to allow for human capital investment to play a role. Early research into 
the effects of formal education on economic growth found that education seemed to 
explain a significant portion of economic growth (Hall 2000). These findings led 
development economists to focus on human capital as a primary factor of production 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Coyne and Boettke 2006). International development 
organizations such as the World Bank encouraged high levels of government investment 
in schooling in an attempt to increase human capital levels. As a result of these efforts, 
there was a tremendous expansion of schooling in nearly all developing countries 
(Easterly 2001). According to Pritchett (2001), since 1960 primary enrollments in 
developing countries increased from 66 to 100 percent and secondary enrollments rose 
from 14 to 40 percent.  
There is little evidence to suggest that efforts to increase capital levels in 
developing countries, especially in Africa, have been successful in generating growth. 
Good historical data on public investment in capital is available for 22 African countries 
since 1970. From 1970-1994, those countries received $187 billion in aid and spent $342 
billion on public investment, only to achieve zero per capita growth (Easterly 2006b). 
The same can be said of the increases in formal schooling stimulated, in part, by foreign 
aid. Easterly (2001) details how sub-Saharan African countries had larger increases in 
schooling than any other region since 1960. Yet these countries remained mired in 
poverty while Asian ‘tigers’ like South Korea and Taiwan had  smaller increases in 
                                                                                                                                                 
the capital that could pull them out of their current misery.” For more on the revival of the ‘Big 
Push’ and ‘poverty trap’ theories of development, see Easterly (2006b). 
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education levels but flourished economically. In cross-country growth regressions, 
Pritchett (2001) finds no relationship between increases education and increases in output 
per worker. Similarly, Gwartney, Holcombe and Lawson (2004) find that the growth of 
human capital per worker is not related to per capita GDP growth.54 
 The macroeconomic evidence is somewhat paradoxical because it is contrary to 
the microeconomic evidence that increases in physical and human capital increase 
individual productivity and remuneration. After all, it would seem that summing all 
individual positives within a country should aggregate to a social positive. Yet it many 
countries this is not the case. In this paper I put forth a potential answer to this question 
by considering the institutional context of capital accumulation. My thesis is that the 
societal payoffs to improvements in the levels of both physical and human capital are 
largely dependent on the institutional context in which those investments occur. 55  
 In countries with good institutions—where the social, political, and legal rules 
provide for secure property rights, unbiased contract enforcement, and reliance on market 
prices and profits and losses to guide economic activity—investments in capital are both 
privately beneficial to individuals and also create a positive return for society as a whole. 
In countries with poor institutions, however, the higher returns to investments in rent-
                                                 
54 There is a large body of empirical literature showing that initial education levels matter for 
economic growth (Barro 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995). Pritchett (2001, 381) argues that 
these papers are misspecified as growth rates are stationary and the education stock is non-
stationary and globally increasing. A stable relationship is thus not possible between education 
and growth when formulated in that manner. In addition, such a formulation cannot explain 
negative growth rates or the fact that fact that the initial level of education has been rising for 
over forty years in sub-Saharan Africa but growth has stagnated or declined.  
55 The idea that additional education, in some instances, might actually yield low or negative 
social returns is not new. In Free to Choose: A Personal Statement, Milton and Rose Friedman 
(1980, 34) suggested that higher education might lead to the disruption of the social order and 
political institutions. Griliches (1997) suggests in a footnote that the effect of education on 
productivity might be muted in countries where most educated individuals end up working within 
governments not known for productivity. 
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seeking activities that plunder the wealth of others, through lobbying and lawsuit abuse, 
for example—draw significant resources into these privately beneficial, but socially 
unproductive activities. Investments in education produce more lobbyists, politicians, and 
lawyers, rather than engineers and scientists.56 In the terminology of Baumol (1990), the 
allocation of entrepreneurial efforts between productive, positive-sum activities and 
unproductive or even destructive, negative-sum activities in a society is a function of the 
returns to these alternative activities that are determined by the quality of a country’s 
legal and political institutions. 
 There are two reasons why capital investments in countries with poor institutions 
should generate a lower social return. I term these the ‘allocation effect’ and the 
‘productivity effect’.  The allocation effect is the process described above, in which poor 
institutions draw a large proportion of new capital investments into socially unproductive 
activities to plunder wealth. Because of this fewer resources are allocated toward 
productive activities that generate additions to the country’s economic output.  The 
second, productivity effect relates to the ability of a country’s economy to properly 
allocate additional capital investments to their highest valued use.  When collective 
decision making and the political process are used to control prices, regulate business 
activities, and enact selective taxes and subsidies that distort the market profit and loss 
mechanism, capital investments will simply not be allocated as efficiently toward their 
highest valued use. Combined, the productivity and allocation effects result in lower, and 
                                                 
56 There is a clear parallel between our argument and that of Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) 
who take the proportion of students enrolled in law as representative of the societal payoffs to 
rent-seeking. They find that countries with a higher proportion of law students have slower 
growth than countries and countries with a higher percentage of students studying engineering 
grow slower.  
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potentially negative, social returns to both physical and human capital investment in 
countries with poor institutions. 
 
4.2 Institutions, Capital, and Growth of Output per Worker 
The conventional perspective on the marginal effect of increases in physical and human 
capital on economic growth is that they have the same marginal effect regardless of the 
level of institutional quality. Figure 4.1 illustrates this view. The figure shows the 
marginal effect of a change in capital per worker on the change in output per worker 
conditional on the level of institutional quality. From this perspective, an additional unit 
of capital has the same impact on economic growth whether the country is in a good 
institutional environment or a poor one. To put it the context of human capital, an 
addition year of education in the Democratic Republic of the Congo would have the same 
effect on the growth of output per worker as a year in Australia. 
My hypothesis is that this view is incorrect because it ignores the impact of 
institutional quality on the productivity and allocation of labor. An additional year of 
education in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is not the same as an additional year 
of education in Australia because of the opportunities provided by the overall institutional 
environment.57 The best opportunities for more educated individuals in countries with 
low-quality institutions are more likely to be zero-or-negative sum, such as working in 
the government bureaucracy. When the institutional environment is ‘bad’, increases in 
                                                 
57 The years of education are also different in that they might come at different levels (primary vs. 
secondary) and that the quality of the education surely differs. As described later, the first 
problem is dealt with in how measures of education growth are constructed. Correction of the 
second problem is hampered by the lack of systematic test score data for a large number of 
countries. 
 67
education levels will be less socially productive than in countries with a ‘good’ 
institutional environment. While individuals will always choose the occupation that gives 
them the highest personal return, good institutions create a correspondence between 
positive personal and positive social returns.   
 
Figure 4.1 
Marginal Effect of Capital on Output per Worker: Conventional View 
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In the long-run, the higher payoffs to public sector activity distort the choices 
individuals make in the types of education to acquire. Thus in a society where the payoffs 
to the private sector are low because of poor institutions but payoffs to the public sector 
are high (also because of poor institutions), individuals will tend to invest in human 
capital more valued by the public sector. For example, Nobel Laureate Sir Arthur Lewis 
discusses in his Nobel Prize lecture how he wanted to be an engineer but could not find 
employment in St. Lucie as an engineer because of discrimination, thus he went into 
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business studies with the goal of working in the civil service or private sector (Lewis 
1992). While both the public and private sector employ engineers, the issue is that in 
countries with poor institutional environments the payoffs to being a private sector 
engineer will be lower and thus we will get fewer engineers and the ones we do have will 
be less alert to positive-sum entrepreneurial opportunities.  
Countries with bad institutions have more zero or negative-sum opportunities and 
thus the marginal effect of more education could be negative if enough of the additional 
education goes into negative-sum activities. Not only are resources being removed from 
production in order to increase education levels (in terms of expenditures on education 
but also opportunity costs), but if educated individuals move into rent-seeking the 
societal payoffs from their education will be negative. At some level of institutional 
quality, however, the rewards to positive-sum activities begin to outweigh the rewards to 
zero and negative-sum activities and the marginal effect of human capital increases on 
growth becomes positive.  
Figure 4.2 illustrates this proposed relationship. The marginal effect of an 
increase in capital is negative when institutional quality is ‘zero.’ While all societies have 
some level of formal or informal institutions, counties like present-day Somalia, Rwanda 
or Venezuela would be examples of countries that have extremely low levels of 
institutional quality according to most measures. At some break-even level of 
institutional quality the allocation of resources between sectors of the economy is 
balanced so that net additions to capital neither add to nor diminish output per worker. As 
institutional quality rises beyond that break-even point, the additions to capital flow to the 
productive sectors of the economy and have a positive contribution to output per worker. 
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This view of the role of institutions in channeling increases in capital towards socially-
productive areas of the economy helps to explain why public investment in human and 
physical capital have not uniformly led to increases in output per worker in the 
developing world.  
 
Figure 4.2 
Marginal Effect of Capital on Output per Worker: Institutional View 
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4.3 Theoretical Model 
In this section I augment a macroeconomic growth model to incorporate the impact of 
institutional quality. Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) first augmented the standard 
Solow (1956) growth model to include human capital. They consider a standard 
aggregate production function given by: 
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321 ααα
ttttt LHKAY =       (1) 
where Y is output, A is the level of technology that augments physical capital (K), human 
capital (H), and labor (L). The production function exhibits the standard assumption of 
constant returns to scale ( 1321 =++ ααα ). Dividing through by L puts (1) in per worker 
terms: 
 21 αα tttt khAy =               (2) 
This traditional model implicitly assumes an underlying set of good institutions. In our 
model, the quality of institutions affects output through the effect that institutions have on 
the productivity of human and physical capital. Thus I specify the technology parameter 
as: 
( ) ( )**
0
21 II
t
II
tt khAA
−−
=
ββ         (3) 
where 0A represents the basic level of technology,
∗I  represents the ideal institutions 
implicitly assumed in the traditional growth model, and I is the country’s current level of 
institutional quality.  Thus, I-I* measures the degree to which the country’s institutions 
fall short of ideal conditions.  When I=I*, the model reduces to its standard form in the 
previous literature. 
Substituting (3) into (2) yields: 
( ) ( ) 2121 **
0
ααββ
tt
II
t
II
tt khkhAy
−−
=           (4) 
Rearranging: 
( ) ( )**
0
2211 II
t
II
tt khAy
−+−+
=
βαβα           (5) 
Taking logs: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] ttt kIIhIIAy ln*ln*lnln 22110 −++−++= βαβα   (6)   
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Here I follow Pritchett (2001) in focusing on explaining the growth of output per worker 
using the growth of physical and human capital per worker. I do this by taking 
differences, which gives the growth rate of output as: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] ttt kIIhIIAy ˆ*ˆ*ˆˆ 22110 −++−++= βαβα            (7) 
where ^ indicates denotes a growth rate.  Simplifying: 
( ) ( ) ttttt kIkIhIhIAy ˆˆ*ˆˆ*ˆˆ 2221110 ββαββα +−++−+=         (8) 
Defining ( )*Iiii βαδ −=  and tAˆ0 =α , and adding an error term, tε  , yields our 
equation to be estimated: 
t22110
ˆˆˆˆˆ εβδβδα +++++= ttttt kIkhIhy     (9) 
Equation (9) is the primary equation I use to test the impact of institutions on the 
productivity of physical and human capital.  Of interest are the coefficient estimates for 
δ1, δ2, β1, and β2.  δ1, and δ2 measure the return to human and physical capital investments 
in a country with the worst possible institutional quality (the left y-axis intercept value in 
Figure 2), while β1, and β2 are the slopes of the respective lines in the figures, showing an 
increasing social return to these capital investments as the country’s institutional quality 
improves to the ideal level for a well-functioning market economy.  
 
4.4 Data and Empirical Approach 
My initial analysis covers a cross-section of 96 countries for the years 1980-2000. I 
obtain data on real output per worker from Baier, Dwyer and Tamura (2006) and 
calculate the cumulative growth of output per worker from 1980 to 2000. The included 
countries are a comprehensive mixture of developed and developing nations from all 
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regions, mitigating any concerns over sample selection bias that can be an issue in cross-
country growth studies (De Long 1988). A full list of the countries is included in 
Appendix Table 3. The average country in our sample had a 16.4 percent increase in 
output per worker increase over the period, with Cyprus having the top growth rate of 
276 percent and the Republic of Congo seeing output per worker fall by 79 percent.  
 I measure institutional quality using an index of the ‘risk of expropriation’ within 
a country. Produced by the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group (2007) and published in 
the International Country Risk Guide, these data were first used as a measure of 
institutional quality by Knack and Keefer (1995) and more recently by Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson (2001a; 2001b) and Glaeser et al. (2005). The PRS Groups 
annually grades each country on the risk of confiscation or forced nationalization of 
property, using a zero-to-ten scale. A score of zero is consistent with a high risk of 
property expropriation and a country with a score of 10 would represent an extremely low 
risk of expropriation. I feel this measure of institutions is most consistent with Acemoglu 
and Johnson’s (2005) finding that property-right institutions are what matter for long-run 
growth. While concerns have been raised over ‘outcome’ measures of institutions 
(Glaeser et al. 2005), written rules ostensibly designed to protect citizens from 
government are useless unless the politically powerful are willing to commit to obeying 
the rules (Boettke 2001, 191-265).  
 I follow convention and use the average risk of expropriation within a country 
over the period in question.58 The average country in the sample had a score of 7.3. The 
country with the lowest risk of expropriation was Switzerland with an average risk of 
expropriation of 9.98, while the country with the greatest average risk of expropriation 
                                                 
58 Specifically, the variable is the average from 1982-1997, obtained from Glaeser et al. (2005).  
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was the Democratic Republic of the Congo with a score of 3.71. The Democratic 
Republic of the Congo having the highest risk of expropriation is illustrative of the 
problem that exists in trying to use input measures of institutions such as constitutions 
instead of output measures, since the recent switch from dictatorship to constitutional 
democracy has not seemed to reduce expropriation of private property (Boettke and 
Leeson 2007).  
Our measure of education is average years of schooling per worker and it is 
obtained from Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura (2006). They calculate the average number of 
years of schooling per worker from primary, secondary, and higher education enrollment 
figures using the perpetual inventory method. The perpetual inventory method uses 
census-survey figures on attainment by age as a measure of the stock of schooling and 
then updates the stock using lagged enrollment figures. I use their estimates of average 
schooling per worker in 1980 and 2000 to calculate the change in schooling per worker 
by country from 1980-2000. Our measure of the change in physical capital per worker 
from 1980 to 2000 is also obtained from Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura (2006). They use the 
perpetual inventory method to calculate the physical capital stock per worker using 
annual investment data from the Summers and Heston (2000) data set and assuming 7 
percent annual depreciation. 
These data on a cross-section of 96 countries allow us to begin addressing the 
relationship between institutions and the productivity of human and physical capital. Our 
equation to be estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is obtained from the 
estimating equation derived in section 3:  
t22110
ˆˆˆˆˆ εβδβδα +++++= ttttt kIkhIhy    (9) 
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where tyˆ  is the cumulative growth rate from 1980 to 2000, 0α is a constant term, thˆ  is 
the change in schooling over that period, and tkˆ is the change in physical capital. The 
interaction terms, thI ˆ  and tkI ˆ  measures how economic growth in different countries 
might respond differently to changes in human and physical capital depending upon the 
level of institutions, measured here by the average level of expropriation risk during the 
period.  
In addition to this basic model, I provide several robustness checks that consider 
additional explanatory variables. For example, a prominent strain of the development 
literature, most notably associated with Jeffrey Sachs (2003), argues that geographic 
factors play an extremely important role the economic development of nations. From 
Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999) I obtain three geographic variables that might 
influence the rate of economic growth. The first geographic variable is the minimum air 
distance a country is from the core markets of Rotterdam, New York, or Tokyo. The 
hypothesis is that the farther a country is from one of these core markets, the more costly 
it is for the country to engage in international trade. Reduced trade will, in turn, reduce 
gains from the division of labor, economies of scale, and specialization. The second 
geographic variable, the percentage of a country’s population living within 100 
kilometers of an ocean, also attempts to measures the degree to which it is costly for the 
citizens of a country to engage in international trade. A high percentage of a country’s 
population with access to an ocean coastline should exert a positive impact on economic 
growth. 
Finally, a country located in a tropical climate might have low rates of economic 
growth because a hot and humid climate reduces the productivity of labor. This can occur 
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directly through work effort or indirectly through health. The prevalence of malaria in 
tropical climates provides one channel through which tropical climate can affect health 
and, indirectly, the productivity of labor. To capture the effect of tropical climate on 
growth, I employ a third geographic variable measuring the proportion of a country 
located in the tropics as an explanatory variable, with the tropics defined as the area 
located between the Tropic of Cancer (23.5 latitude North) and Tropic of Capricorn (23.5 
latitude South). These geographic variables are employed both in the baseline empirical 
analysis in Section 4.6 as well as the sensitivity analysis in Section 4.7. 
 
4.5 A First Look  
Before proceeding to the regression analysis, I provide some evidence for the proposition 
that the effect of investment in capital depends on the institutional environment using the 
raw data. To get an idea of how the returns to schooling differ by institutional quality, I 
broke down countries into two groups: those with the lowest risk of expropriation and 
those with the highest risk. I split the sample of 96 countries into two groups based on 
their average risk of expropriation score, with countries below the median score of 7.06 
being defined as ‘high risk’ and those above defined as ‘low risk.’ Figure 4.3 shows the 
relationship between changes in schooling per worker and growth in output per worker 
for these different groups.  
Among countries with the lowest risk of expropriation, countries with schooling 
growth above 50 percent from 1980-2000 grew slightly faster than countries where 
schooling growth was below 50 percent. For countries with the highest risk of 
expropriation, however, the exact opposite was the case. While all countries with poor 
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protection of property rights saw negative real growth during this period, those countries 
with schooling growth below 50 percent had an average growth of output per worker of 
negative 3.7 percent compared to negative 25.3 percent for countries with schooling 
growth above 50 percent. Clearly, countries with bad institutions did poorly over this 
time period; however, those countries with the largest increases in education did the 
worst.  
 
Figure 4.3 
The Stratification of the Returns to Schooling by Risk of Expropriation 
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4.6 Empirical Results 
Table 4.1 presents our regression results that examine the effect of institutions on the 
impact of human and physical capital growth on a country’s rate of economic growth. 
Column 1 is the baseline regression consistent with equation (9) derived in Section 4.3. 
The model fits the data well, explaining 56 percent of the variation in the change in 
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output per worker between 1980 and 2000. The coefficients on both interaction terms are 
positive and statistically significant, while the coefficients on the change in physical and 
the change in human capital are negative and significant. These results are consistent with 
our hypothesis that changes in physical and human capital only have a positive effect on 
the rate of economic growth where strong property-rights institutions are in place. In 
countries with strong institutions, increases in human and physical capital have a larger 
effect on economic growth rates than in countries with bad institutions.  
 
Independent Variables
Constant -1.17 0.96 6.17 9.91
(0.28) (0.11) (0.81) (1.54)
-0.719 *** -0.734 *** -0.637 *** -0.362 *
(3.59) (3.64) (3.13) (1.67)
-0.789 *** -0.793 *** -0.735 *** -0.762 ***
(8.05) (8.10) (6.56) (7.62)
0.098 *** 0.100 *** 0.087 *** 0.050 *
(3.60) (3.64) (3.14) (1.68)
0.161 *** 0.162 *** 0.153 *** 0.158 ***
(10.83) (10.73) (9.63) (11.65)
-0.042
(0.34)
-0.0018
(1.15)
-0.243 **
(2.54)
Number of Observations 96 96 96 96
Adj. r-squared 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.59
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
Table 4.1
Absolute value of heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics in parentheses.
Growth of Schooling Per Worker 
(Baier et al.), 1980-2000
2
The Determinants of Economic Growth
Dependent Variable: Growth of Output per Worker, 1980-2000
1 43
Air Distance from Major Trading 
Centers
Percentage of Land Area Located 
in Tropics
Growth of Physical Capital Per 
Worker, 1980-2000
Growth of Schooling Per Worker × 
Risk of Expropriation
Growth of Physical Capital Per 
Worker × Risk of Expropriation
Percentage of Population within 
100km of Coast
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In Columns 2, 3, and 4 of Table 1 I included additional geographic variables 
thought to impact economic growth. Importantly, the inclusion of these variables does not 
qualitatively change the results of our basic regression. In all three additional columns, 
the signs and coefficients on each of the variables are very similar to those in Column 1. 
One notable exception is in Column 4, where the coefficients on human and physical 
capital per worker variables were reduced in magnitude. Note, however, that the 
coefficients on each of the interaction terms are very similar to the coefficients in the 
previous regressions suggesting that good institutions still channel physical and human 
capital to productive ends in tropical environments.  
The only geographic variable to add any explanatory power to the model is the 
percentage of the land area in the tropics. A country entirely located in the tropics is 
expected to have a cumulative growth rate 24.3 percentage points lower from 1980-2000 
than a country with none of its area in the tropics. The other two geographic variables are 
not statistically or economically meaningful, with the percentage of the population within 
100 kilometers even having the opposite sign of what is expected.  
In Figure 4.4 I take the coefficients from Column 1 above and put them in the 
context of the framework put forth in Figure 4.2. The negative left y-axis intercept values 
of -0.719 and -0.789 for human and physical capital respectively show the socially 
negative returns to investments in these areas in countries scoring the worst possible 
value on the risk of expropriation measure (remember this index is increasing in property 
rights protection).  The intercept values along the right y-axis show the return in a country 
with ideal institutional quality. I find that the ‘break-even’ point is a risk of expropriation 
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score of 7.33 for human capital investment and 4.90 for physical capital investment.59 In 
countries with a high risk of expropriation (a score below 4.90) the social returns to both 
types of capital investment are negative. Increases in either type of capital have a positive 
effect on output per worker in countries with a risk of expropriation score greater than 
7.33.  
 
Figure 4.4 
The Marginal Effect of Capital on Growth: An Estimate 
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 The level of institutional quality required to generate a positive return to 
education is higher than the level necessary to produce a positive return to physical 
capital investment. This implies that in countries with mid-range scores (between 4.90 
                                                 
59 A risk of expropriation score of 7.33 is a consistent with the institutions of a country such as 
South Africa while Guinea-Bissau is a country just below 4.90. 
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and 7.33) that focusing on investments in physical capital are likely to promote economic 
development to a much greater extent than additional investments in human capital. The 
greater slope coefficient for physical capital implies that the productivity of physical 
capital investment is more sensitive to institutional quality than the productivity of human 
capital investment. 
My estimates explain why some countries that have had large increases in formal 
schooling from 1980 to 2000 have also seen real output decline over that period. A 
country that falls in this category is Haiti, which had an average risk of expropriation 
over this period of 4.17.  Education levels in Haiti increased by over 120 percent from 
1980 to 2000. At the same time, however, real output per worker declined by 26 percent. 
Guineau-Bissau, Iran, Madagascar, Niger, the Republic of the Congo, and Uganda are all 
countries with low (below 5.6) risk of expropriation scores that had increases in 
education levels over 80 percent and real output per worker declines of greater than 20 
percent.  
 
4.7  Sensitivity Analysis 
A potential concern about the basic results presented in Section 6 is that they might be 
sensitive to how institutional quality or changes in schooling are measured. For example, 
much of the cross-country economic growth literature uses educational levels from Barro 
and Lee (2000). While I employ the Baier, Dwyer and Tamura (2006) data in our initial 
analysis because I believe they are more up-to-date and expansive than the Barro-Lee 
calculations, I obtained the Barro-Lee data for the available countries in our data set in 
order to test the robustness of our results to an alternative measure of schooling increase. 
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From the Barro and Lee (2000) data set I obtained the years of education for individuals 
fifteen and older in 1980 and 2000 and then calculated the change in education from 1980 
to 2000.60 Twelve countries in our sample were not in the data set thus the sample 
contains only 84 countries.61 The correlation between the two measures of schooling is 
0.56. 
Table 4.2 presents the results using the Barro and Lee measure of schooling rather 
than the Baier, Dwyer and Tamura measure. In the table I consider each of the 
specifications from Table 1. The basic specification is in Column 1, and the results are 
similar in significance to our previous results. In the other specifications the results are 
consistent with those in Table 1 with the exception of the growth of physical capital per 
worker. While the sign on that variable is still negative, it is not statistically significant in 
Columns 2-4. Two other items of note are that air distance from major trading centers is 
statistically significant and the coefficient on the percentage of population within 100k of 
the coast now has the correct sign.  
To this point our measure of institutional quality has been the ‘risk of 
expropriation’ of private property. The other measure of institutions frequently employed 
in the literature is the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index by Gwartney and 
Lawson (2003).  The EFW index measures the degree to which a country’s economy is 
consistent with ‘economic freedom,’ e.g., personal choice, voluntary exchange, and 
security of private property.  
 
                                                 
60 Note that here education is not measured in per worker terms but in per capita (15 and older) 
terms. The Barro and Lee (2000) data set does not provide enough detail for conversion to per 
worker terms.  
61 The regressions presented in Table 1 were run using only the 84 countries available in Table 2 
and the results were qualitatively and quantitatively similar. 
 82
Independent Variables
Constant 2.20 1.21 10.74 12.74 ***
(0.39) (0.17) (1.53) (2.67)
-0.800 *** -0.788 *** -0.779 *** -0.628 **
(3.10) (2.92) (2.81) (2.37)
-0.593 * -0.592 * -0.478 -0.470
(1.85) (1.83) (1.50) (1.43)
0.106 *** 0.104 ** 0.106 ** 0.087 **
(2.69) (2.52) (2.54) (2.28)
0.134 *** 0.133 *** 0.117 *** 0.117 ***
(3.47) (3.43) (3.05) (2.98)
0.017
(0.18)
-0.0023 *
(1.69)
-0.243 ***
(3.21)
Number of Observations 84 84 84 84
Adj. r-squared 0.67 0.63 0.64 0.68
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
Table 4.2
Absolute value of heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics in parentheses.
Air Distance from Major Trading 
Centers
Percentage of Land Area Located 
in Tropics
Growth of Physical Capital Per 
Worker, 1980-2000
Growth of Schooling Per Worker × 
Risk of Expropriation
Growth of Physical Capital Per 
Worker × Risk of Expropriation
Percentage of Population within 
100km of Coast
Growth of Schooling Per Worker 
(Barro), 1980-2000
2
The Determinants of Economic Growth: Alternative Measure of Education
Dependent Variable: Growth of Output per Worker, 1980-2000
1 43
 
 
The index measures the quality of a country’s policies and institutions in five 
areas: (1) size of government, (2) legal structure and security of property rights, (3) 
access to sound money, (4) freedom to trade internationally, and (5) regulation of capital, 
labor, and business. Data from third-party international sources such as the World Bank 
and IMF are used to derive each country’s ratings in each the five areas. The area 
rankings are then averaged together to create a summary ranking for each country 
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included in the index.62 The ranking theoretically varies from 0 (no economic freedom) to 
10 (complete economic freedom).  
As an additional measure of institutions, the EFW index has two advantages. 
First, like the risk of expropriation data, the index has been used in a number of studies 
on institutions and growth (see, for example, Dawson 1998; Sturm and De Haan 2001; 
Adkins, Moomaw, and Savvides, 2002; Cole 2003; Gwartney, Holcombe, and Lawson 
2006).  Second, since the EFW index is calculated using policy variables such as tax 
rates, use of the index provides clearer guidance to policymakers unlike indirect measures 
of institutions such as surveys or instrumental variables (Gwartney, Holcombe, and 
Lawson 2006).  For the time period of 1980 to 2000, the EFW index is available at five-
year intervals starting with 1980. The average country in the data set had a mean 
economic freedom score of 5.67, equal to Guatemala’s mean summary ranking for the 
period. Hong Kong has the highest average economic freedom over the period with a 
score of 8.6 and the Democratic Republic of the Congo has the lowest score at 3.61.  
Table 4.3 shows the results for the regressions run in Table 4.1 with the average 
EFW score inserted used instead of the risk of expropriation. The results are less robust 
using the EFW index, with growth of physical capital per worker and its interaction with 
the index being statistically insignificant in all but the last specification. The growth of 
schooling per worker and its interaction with economic freedom have the correct signs, 
however, and are strongly significant except in the final specification that includes the 
tropical location variable. In all cases, however, a joint F-test shows that each pair of 
                                                 
62 The most recent version of the EFW index (Gwartney and Lawson, 2006), which measures 
economic freedom for 2004, rates 130 countries. The decision to include or exclude from the 
index depends solely on the quality of the available data, with data being unavailable mainly for 
autocratic or small countries.  
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variables is jointly significant. These results seem to confirm the general hypothesized 
relationship found earlier. 
 
Independent Variables
Constant 9.27 * 12.96 26.05 *** 24.49 ***
(1.68) (1.21) (2.94) (3.44)
-0.732 *** -0.782 *** -0.529 ** -0.297
(3.03) (2.78) (2.18) (0.96)
-0.220 -0.234 -0.192 -0.431
(0.50) (0.53) (0.50) (1.25)
0.109 *** 0.116 *** 0.079 ** 0.044
(3.03) (2.78) (2.19) (0.97)
0.097 0.100 0.091 0.129 **
(1.46) (1.52) (1.55) (2.47)
-0.06
(0.47)
-0.005 **
(2.48)
-0.376 ***
(3.70)
Number of Observations 103 103 103 103
Adj. r-squared 0.35 0.35 0.39 0.44
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
Table 4.3
Absolute value of heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics in parentheses.
Growth of Schooling Per Worker 
(Baier et al.), 1980-2000
2
The Determinants of Economic Growth: Alternative Measure of Institutions
Dependent Variable: Growth of Output per Worker, 1980-2000
1 43
Air Distance from Major Trading 
Centers
Percentage of Land Area Located 
in Tropics
Growth of Physical Capital Per 
Worker, 1980-2000
Growth of Schooling Per Worker × 
Avg EFW 1980-2000
Growth of Physical Capital Per 
Worker × Avg EFW 1980-2000
Percentage of Population within 
100km of Coast
 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
Since World War II, the development-policymaking community has stressed the 
importance of capital accumulation. Large amounts of aid from developed countries and 
international aid organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank 
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have flowed to developing countries to encourage the capital investment though 
necessary for poor countries to ‘take-off’ on the path to development. Cross-country 
studies show, however, that the macroeconomic relationship between capital 
accumulation and growth is not as robust as the microeconomic relationship would 
suggest. 
In this paper I provide an answer to this paradox by developing a model that 
allows the effect of changes in capital on changes in output per worker to vary along with 
the quality of institutions in a country. I empirically test this hypothesis using data on a 
large cross-section of countries and find that the effect of changes in human and physical 
capital varies considerably along the institutional quality continuum, measured by IRG 
data on the risk of expropriation within a country. I calculate that for countries with risk 
of expropriation scores below 4.90, additions to both the stock of physical and human 
capital have a negative effect on growth of output per worker. For countries between 4.90 
and 7.33, increases in physical capital per worker have a positive impact but increases in 
schooling are still negative. Above 7.33, all increases in capital per worker increase 
output per worker. 
The finding that capital increases only have a positive impact on growth once a 
‘break-even’ level of institutional quality is a strong argument against naive proposals to 
double the capital stock in developing countries to double their income.63 If aid flows are 
inevitable, however, these findings suggest that spending should be focused on 
investment in physical capital if the country has a risk of expropriation score between 
4.90 and 7.33. More importantly, however, these results focus attention towards 
                                                 
63 For example, Jeffrey Sachs (2005, 250) has said that “The likelihood is that doubling the 
human and physical capital stock will actually more than double the income level, at least at very 
low levels of capital per person.” 
 86
institutional reform as the key to economic progress so that future increases in physical 
and human capital will generate positive social returns as well as private ones. 
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Chapter 5 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
 
At its core, the economics of education is about political economy since all of the 
important questions revolve around government involvement in education financing and 
provision. Most of the enduring research questions in the economics of education would 
be of little concern if there were no public involvement in the financing or production of 
education. The effectiveness of resource usage within schools is a far less interesting and 
important research question if school spending is the result of voluntary actions between 
parents and education providers instead of the outcome of collective action. Thus the 
economic study of education is ultimately about the effectiveness of the political, social, 
legal, and economic institutions that have evolved over time to finance and produce 
educated citizens. This dissertation contributes to the scholarly literature by more 
explicitly considering the effect that the variation in educational institutions across 
geographic space has on education outcomes and financing.  
 Chapter 2 analyzes the effect of racial diversity on educational outcomes using 
cross-sectional data on Ohio school districts. Racial diversity has a negative association 
with school district passage rates on state proficiency exams. The results are robust to a 
variety of empirical approaches and alternative specifications and evidence is presented 
that suggest reverse-causality is not driving the results. The higher a school districts 
academic performance in 1990, the more diverse that district was in 2000, suggesting that 
school quality leads to diversity, not vice versa. While the exact causal link between 
racial diversity and school performance is unclear, identification of a negative 
relationship between diversity at the school district level and school district performance 
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is a first step towards determining if the cause is the racial peer effect channel or the 
voting channel.   
A one standard deviation increase in racial diversity is associated with a decline in 
district math test scores of between 1.1 and 3.3 percentage points, depending upon the 
empirical specification. While seemingly not that large, recall that this is the net effect of 
racial diversity on test scores. Since some previous research has found that African-
American students benefit from increased diversity while White and Asian students do 
worse from it, this suggests that the effects of diversity on individuals might be quite 
larger if disaggregated. At the same time, however, maximizing school performance is 
not the same thing as maximizing utility. Households take many factors into account 
before deciding where to live and send their children to school (Pritchett and Filmer 
1999). The possibility of lower test scores might well be an acceptable trade-off for 
parents wanting to live in a racially diverse community. 
Over the past thirty years a primary reason for the increase in state financing of 
education has been a wave of court-ordered school finance reforms that have significantly 
increased state spending on education (Murray, Evans, and Schwab 1998).  There have 
been efforts in nearly every state to challenge the constitutionality of school finance 
systems that produce unequal levels of school funding and unequal school outcomes 
among school districts. Even in states where the school funding system was ruled to be 
constitutional, litigation has spurred considerable changes. Since 1970, every state has 
changed their school finance system to create a more equal distribution of funding among 
districts (Hoxby 2001). States responded in many ways to these constitutional challenges. 
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Ohio, for example, gave school districts the ability to raise additional revenue by levying 
a tax on income instead of relying solely on property taxes. 
The fact that the State of Ohio gave local school districts the option of asking 
voters to approve a school district income tax provides an excellent opportunity to test 
some elements of the literature on government choice among tax instruments. Standard 
public finance principles would suggest that local governments such as school districts 
should diversify across as many revenues sources as possible. The idea is that 
diversification helps to mitigate the effects of any adverse shocks to school district 
revenues. A school district relying too much on the property tax, for example, might see a 
catastrophic fall in revenues if the largest manufacturer in the area closed. Given this risk, 
it is surprising that only one-fifth of school districts in Ohio utilize the income tax. 
Spry (2005) provides evidence that competition among local school districts 
depresses the use of an income tax. The argument is that a school district enacting an 
income tax in an area with a competitive local education market would soon see all of its 
high-income households migrate to nearby districts without an income tax. Only in rural 
areas where the costs of moving are higher either in terms of commuting distance (if 
remaining at current job) or job relocation will we see widespread use of an income tax, 
other things equal. This explanation fits the raw data very well, since most of the school 
districts using the income tax are in rural areas.  
Chapter 3 uses spatial econometric techniques to test for spatial dependence and 
spatial error correlation in the use of an income tax. Once spatial effects are accounted 
for, fiscal competition among local school districts no longer is found to depress use of 
the income tax.  The spatial lag term is positive and significant, providing evidence of 
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yardstick competition in income tax adoption. School districts are more likely to adopt an 
income tax if their neighbors currently utilize and income tax. The empirical results point 
to tax exporting as the primary reason why school districts do not utilize the income tax 
more often. The burden of the school district income tax is 100 percent on local residents, 
whereas some proportion of a property tax that raised the same amount of revenue would 
be exported onto non-resident property owners.  Given that, the more interesting question 
is not why do so few school districts utilize the income tax but why do so many? 
While Chapters 2 and 3 deal with fairly narrow but important topics in the 
economics of education, Chapter 4 deals with the link between education and growth. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the importance of institutions for the return on the accumulation of 
human and physical capital. Since the 1940s, the international development community 
has advocated and funded human and physical capital accumulation efforts in the 
developing world to push these countries onto a higher growth path. The cross-country 
evidence is mixed, however, and sometimes countries economically stagnate in spite of 
significant increases in education levels and physical capital. 
Chapter 4 develops a theoretical model that allows the effect of changes in capital 
on output growth per worker to vary with institutional quality. Using a large cross-section 
of countries, I empirically test this model using data on the ‘risk of expropriation’ within 
a country as a measure of institutional quality. The results of the chapter are that the 
return on human and physical capital investment does vary considerably with institutional 
quality. For countries with risk of expropriation scores up to 4.90, additions to human and 
physical capital lower the growth of output per worker. Between 4.90 and 7.33, physical 
capital per worker has a positive impact on growth of output per worker but increasing 
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human capital per worker still reduces growth of output per worker. When the risk of 
expropriation in a country is above 7.33, increases in both human and physical capital per 
worker raise the growth rate of output per worker.  
This finding has three important implications for international development 
efforts. First, it shows that lack of capital is not the primary problem facing most 
undeveloped nations. Second, assuming holding the amount of foreign aid going to a 
country constant, the returns to physical and human capital differ at different levels of 
institutional quality. Specifically, for those countries with risk of expropriation scores 
between 4.90 and 7.33, aid should be shifted towards physical capital accumulation and 
away from human capital accumulation efforts. More importantly, the third implication 
of Chapter 4 is that development efforts should be focused on reforming institutions.  
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-0.94 *** 0.16 -1.11 *** 0.23
(3.21) (0.92) (3.88) (1.10)
-0.1206 *** -0.0951 *** -0.2093 *** -0.0416 *
(3.51) (3.74) (5.38) (1.68)
-0.0045 -0.0039 ** -0.0074 ** -0.0038
(1.45) (1.97) (2.03) (1.48)
0.0002 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006
(0.30) (0.94) (0.61) (1.03)
1.9351 *** 0.8874 *** 2.1585 *** 0.7801 ***
(6.55) (4.96) (7.45) (3.66)
-0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0026 **
(0.89) (1.49) (1.04) (2.18)
0.0010 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0008
(1.15) (0.19) (0.47) (1.25)
-0.0202 -0.0212 -0.0839 ** 0.0097
(0.56) (0.88) (2.35) (0.39)
Density -0.0027 * -0.0017 -0.0038 ** -0.0018 *
(1.95) (1.27) (1.99) (1.84)
District Size -0.0012 ** -0.0010 *** -0.0011 * -0.0007 **
(2.09) (3.47) (1.91) (2.05)
0.1153 *** 0.0524 ** 0.1564 *** 0.0475 *
(3.22) (2.23) (4.17) (1.82)
-0.1365 *** -0.1198 *** -0.1836 *** -0.0705 ***
(3.58) (4.19) (4.56) (2.55)
Number of Observations 607 607 607 607
R-squared 0.55 0.56 0.66 0.33
Absolute value of heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics in parentheses.
Average Teacher Salary 
Teacher Inexperience
College
Lunch
Expenditure Per Pupil   
Income
Attendance
Pupil/Teacher Ratio
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
Writing
Racial Diversity and Non-Math Test Scores
Appendix Table 1
Note : Expenditure Per Pupil, Income, Average Teacher Salary, Density, and District Size in 
thousands.
Constant
Racial Diversity 2000
Citizenship Reading Science
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Variable
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Within 10 -0.069 -0.067 -0.057
Within 12 -0.006
Within 15 -0.008
Herfindahl -0.010
Property Tax Price 0.062 0.058 0.056 0.054 0.059 0.050
Income Tax Price -0.122 -0.120 -0.044 -0.099 -0.095 -0.050
% Renters -0.002 -0.004 0.030 0.033 0.031 0.024
City Tax Dummy 0.060 0.054 0.055 0.053 0.069 0.055
% Senior Citizens -0.014 -0.019 0.003 -0.008 -0.002 0.000
% of Agricultural Property 0.065 0.054 0.070 0.068 0.080 0.064
% of Mineral Property -0.052 -0.054 -0.025 -0.017 -0.028 -0.029
% of Business Property -0.056 -0.056 -0.072 -0.068 -0.093 -0.069
% of Rural Residents 0.024 0.013 0.054 0.060 0.062 0.047
Non-Spatial 
Probit 
(Table 2, 
Column 1)
Appendix Table 2 
SDP Model 
(Table 2, 
Column 3)
SARP 
Model 
(Table 2, 
Column 2)
 Marginal Effects Times Standard Deviations
SDP Model 
(Table 2, 
Column 1)
SDP Model 
(Table 2, 
Column 2)
SDP Model 
(Table 2, 
Column 3)
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Algeria Guinea-Bissau² Papau New Guinea
Argentina Haiti Paraguay
Australia Honduras Peru
Austria Hong Kong Philippines
Bangladesh Hungary Poland
Belgium India Portugal
Benin¹ Indonesia Romania²
Bolivia Iran Rwanda¹
Botswana Ireland Senegal
Brazil Israel Sierra Leone
Bulgaria² Italy Singapore
Burundi¹ Jamaica South Africa
Cameroon Japan South Korea
Canada Jordan Spain
Central African Republic¹ Kenya Sri Lanka
Chad¹ Kuwait Sweden
Chile Madagascar² Switzerland
China Malawi Syria
Colombia Malaysia Taiwan
Congo, Democratic Republic Mali Tanzania²
Congo, Republic of the Mauritius¹ Thailand
Costa Rica Mexico Togo
Cote d'Ivoire² Morocco² Trinidad & Tobago
Denmark Myanmar Tunisia
Dominican Rep. Namibia² Turkey
Ecuador Nepal¹ Uganda
Egypt Netherlands United Arab Emirates²
El Salvador New Zealand United Kingdom
Finland Nicaragua United States
France Niger Uruguay
Gabon² Nigeria² Venezuela
Germany Norway Zambia
Ghana Oman² Zimbabwe
Greece Pakistan
Guatemala Panama
¹ Countries without risk of expropriation data and thus excluded from Table 4.1 regression
² Countries without Barro schooling data and thus excluded from Table 4.2 regressions.
List of Countries
Appendix Table 3
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